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SYMPOSIUM
Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in
Domestic Fiscal Policy
MICHAEL FITTS*
AND ROBERT INMAN**

Over the past twenty years the performance of the United States Congress
on budgetary policy has been the subject of increasing criticism. The overall
growth in government spending has been profound during this period, driven
in large measure by increases in social insurance outlays, domestic program
expenditures and tax favors, and interest payments made necessary by prior
deficit financing. While certainly some of these increased expenditures may
be explained and justified on grounds of allocative efficiency and redistribu
tion, there is programmatic evidence that much of this recent growth in cen
tral government domestic outlays may be excessive, reaching beyond the
limits of efficient and equitable allocations. 1 The criticisms have been per
haps the most intense concerning expenditures on localized domestic pro
grams and tax favors. These nondefense, nonsocial insurance expenditures
examples include outlays for public infrastructures, agricultural subsidies,
corporate loan guarantees, state/local government grants-have risen, in
constant 1982 dollars, from $613 per person in 1970 to $990 per person in
1988. Similarly, tax expenditures or tax favors, which measure revenue lost
due to tax deductions, exemptions, and credits, have shown an increase from
$463 per person in 1970 to $949 in 1988. As a share of government spend
ing, domestic program spending and tax favors now constitute 43.9% of all
federal outlays, up from 40.9% in 1970. While real national income has
grown at an annual rate of 2.8% from 1970 to 1988, real domestic program
spending and tax favors have grown at an annual rate of 3.4%. 2
*

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Professor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, and Professor of Law and Economics,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
The authors wish to thank the UPS Foundation for financial support and their colleagues from
the PARSS Workshop on Government and Institutions for their insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1 . The literature critically evaluating recent government fiscal policies is extensive, but a good
overview with references can be found in JOHN QUIGLEY & DAN I EL R UBINFELD, AMERICAN Do
**

M ESTIC PRIORITIES: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL ( 1 985).
2. See Robert Inman & Michael Fitts, Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the
U.S. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN IZATION 79, 79-80 tbl. I ( 1 990). The results in this

paper, summarized above, are our best estimates of localized domestic spending. The aggregates we
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Why have federal government outlays (in particular, domestic program
spending and tax favors) grown so significantly in recent years? In attempt
ing to understand the root causes of this fiscal growth, we must move beyond
usual economic explanations based on income growth and consumer prefer
ences to an understanding of the political environment in which these fiscal
allocations are made. Scholars writing in the public choice/political econ
omy tradition have focused on the organizational problems of competing in
terest groups in the public at large as well as the organizational structure of
Congress itself. 3 The literature on Congress has emphasized the decentrali
zation of that institution into subcommittees and the relative autonomy those
committees enjoy in decisionmaking within their jurisdictions. 4 In respond
ing to the collective action problems of decisionmaking in a multimember
legislative body, the committee structure permits Congress to avoid policy
chaos and make stable decisions, as well as develop expertise on substantive
issues. At the same time, it also appears, according to many writers, to result
in a high degree of inefficiency in budgeting decisions. 5
In this article, we explore the potential role of the President in overcoming
inefficiencies in congressional budgeting and in improving the economic per
formance of Congress. Our interest in the potential influence of the Presi
dent on fiscal policy grows out of the strong empirical results of our earlier
research. These results suggest that influential Presidents throughout most
of American history, and regardless of political party, have had statistically
significant and quantitatively important effects on the levels of domestic
spending and tax favors, typically acting to reduce such outlays. 6 The work
presented here makes an effort to explain exactly how such presidential influ
ence might arise.
In Part I we review how the structure of Congress is both affected by the
political forces of special interest politics, and, at the same time, exacerbates
many of their negative consequences. We also consider the likely economic
performance of Congress, both from an equity and an efficiency perspective;
our focus will be on the domestic program budget and the provision of tax
favors by Congress. As we argue, and as initial evidence indicates, there are
good reasons to suspect the current domestic spending and tax budgets fall
use are likely to over-estimate true localized spending to the extent they include administrative
overhead or other truly national public goods. We do not feel this upward bias is serious.
3. The classic work on these organizational incentives, of course, is MANCUR OLSEN, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ( 1 965). See also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION ( 1 98 2).
For an insightful discussion of the organizational and informational advantages of the President
relative to Congress, see Gary Miller, Abnormal Politics: Possibilities for Presidential Leadership
( 1 99 1) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
4. See infra 11otes 1 0- 1 7 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 1 8-34 and accompanying text.
6. See Inman & Fitts, supra note 2, at 124.
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short in terms of both equity and efficiency. In Part I I we then explore how
the resources of the presidency can be used to overcome some of the negative
consequences of a decentralized legislative organization. In this sense the
presidency can be compared to other devices that have recently been offered
to improve congressional decisionmaking, such as Gramm-Rudman 7 and
legislative commissions. 8 The institution of the presidency also can be
viewed as a potential substitute for more centralized committees in Congress
and stronger political parties, two mechanisms which historically served to
improve the efficiency of Congress, but which have diminished in impor
tance. In Part III we offer some evidence from the recent fiscal histories of
the Carter and Reagan presidencies to illustrate how our analysis might help
clarify the nature of presidential influence.
In this article, we do not intend to argue for increased presidential power.
Certainly, presidential powers, and individual Presidents, can be associated
with a variety of goals, principles, and interests, some of which may be quite
negative. We do not, and cannot, address all of these important issues in the
analysis or formal political model presented here. 9 Rather, our only purpose
is predictive: to show, using the framework of positive political theory, how
existing tools of presidential influence in the legislative arena, often consid
ered by scholars to be quite weak, can be used strategically to reform a de
centralized Congress, even when all members might initially resist change.
The analysis not only helps explain recent presidential-legislative interactions
over fiscal policy, but also shows why and how political patronage and execu
tive discretion, traditionally viewed as a source of government inefficiency,
can be important positive elements for fiscal reform. Finally, the article also
suggests ways future public executives-be they Presidents, governors, or
mayors-might be successful in their efforts to reform the economic perform
ance of their own legislative bodies and receive political advantages for doing
so!

7. See Edward M. Gramlich, U.S. Federal Budget Deficits and Gramm-R udman-Hollings, 80
A M . ECON. REV. 7 5 ( 1 990).
8. See PAUL LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK : THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 232 ( 1 9 8 5)
(positing that where the President and Congress decide to move on a cont roversial issue, commis
sions can provide the needed cover allowing them to do so); Hoadley, Easy Riders: Gramm-R ud
man-Hollings and the Legislative Fast Track, 1 9 PoL Scr. & PoL. 30 (198 6); Joe White, The
Continuing Resolution: A Crazy Way to Govern?, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 2 8 , 29 ( 1 9 8 8 ) (discussing criti
cisms of the continuing resolution as an appropriate device).
9. For attempts to confront some of these problems, see generally Morris Fiorina, An Era of
Divided Government, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN POL ITICS (Bruce Cain et a!. , 1 990);
Michael Fitts, Taking Institutions Seriously: Why and How I nterdisciplinary Legal Scholars
Should Engage In Institutional Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law
Journa{) (exploring the disjunction between ideal type institutional analysis and real world perform
ance of legai and political institutions).
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I . THE FISCAL PERFORMANCE OF A DECENTRALIZED CONGRESS
A. DECENTRALIZATION IN CONGRESS TODAY

The problems associated with the performance of our current Congress
have their roots in a variety of phenomena. Among the external factors that
have been cited, and which we do not discuss at length here, are the limited
time horizon of the public and its representatives, imperfect information
among constituents about the actions of their legislators, campaign and cam
paign finance rules, and, more generally, voters' collective action problems. 1 0
While each of these external factors are potentially important, our concern
here will be with the role that decentralized authority itself plays as a major
source of the difficulty in Congressional decisionmaking. Obviously, the con
stitutionally mandated structure of Congress is formally decentralized, with
435 representatives in the House, and 100 in the Senate, all elected indepen
dently from local districts. That such decentralized legislatures may fail to
reach decisions through simple majority rule is well known. Unfortunately,
the extra-constitutional structure of Congress-namely, the organization not
set forth in the Constitution but critical to its daily operation-may fail not
only to overcome the shortcomings of decentralized authority, but may exac
erbate them. There are two aspects to this system.
First, the formal committee structure of Congress has changed and decen
tralized over the years. Many years ago, in the days of House Speakers
Thomas Reed and Joseph Cannon (over the period 1 889 to 1 9 1 1 ), the
Speaker was a powerful position. Later, with the decline of the power of the
Speaker, the powers of committee chairs were greatly enhanced. 1 1 Today,
power has generally moved down to the many subcommittees, substantially
enhancing the influence of individual members of Congress, as against the
leadership. 12 The formal structure of the House and Senate tends now to
1 0. As Barry Weingast and William Marshall have written, "rational [voter] ignorance under
pins interest group advantage in politics. Because most voters have only a dim awareness of [their
representatives' actions, rational ignorance biases political response toward those who do form im
pressions." Barry Weingast & William Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
L egislatures, Like Firms, A re Not Organized as Markets, 9 6 J . PoL. EcoN. 1 32, 1 3 6 ( 1 988).
1 1 . See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. , THE POWER OF THE PURSE ( 1 966) (demonstrating
the importance of committee-centered analysis for increasing understanding of Congress); CHARLES
STEWART, BUDGET REFORM POLITICS: THE DESIGN OF THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1 86 5- 1 9 2 1 , at 3-53 ( 1 989).
1 2. See gen erally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. , CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES ( 1 973) (examining
how congressional committees differ systematically and with respect to five variables: member
goals, environmental constraints, strategic premises, decisionmaking processes, and decisions).
With the 1 974 and 1 980 reforms, the House and Senate attempted to establish a budget process that
would centralize power over the committees, but the evidence is that the reforms have not played
the expected role. Indeed, President Reagan used the process in his first term to bypass normal
budgeting procedures. While it is true the floor became an increasing locus of decisionmaking in
the 1 9 80s, and the power of the Rules Committee was enhanced, it is unclear whether this has led,
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reflect disproportionately the local constituent interests of their memberships
and the public that elects them.
In addition to this institutional decentralization, and undoubtedly related
to it, Congress today lacks strong political parties as an alternative, informal
centralizing force. There are at least two reasons. First, parties' importance
as a key to public voting behavior-as a psychological "anchor" in an uncer
tain world of political claims-has diminished over the past thirty years. 1 3
Not only has the number of registered o r self-identified independent voters
increased, but even those who are registered or who identify with a particular
party tend to vote with their leaders less often than in the past. Second, in
addition to party identification, the strength of parties as political organiza
tions with separate influence over members' votes in Congress also appears
not to be great, although there has been a resurgence in ideological polariza
tion in party voting in the 1 980s. While the lack of significant party identifi
cation in the public clearly is one reason for such limited party influence,
there are probably other (related) reasons as well-namely, the reduction in
party controlled political patronage, the access of individual legislators to the
media and publicity, 14 the rise of political action committees (PACs) as
sources of candidate funding, 1 5 and the elimination of party control over the
nomination process.1 6 Although the relative centralization of power in Con
gress through party and committee leadership changes over time and issues,
today each of these factors tends to enhance the political independence of
individual members of Congress. 1 7
on balance, to significant centralized control. See STEVEN SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR PoLI
TICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE ( 1989); STANLEY BACH & STEVEN SMITH, MANAGING UNCER
TAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES

( 1988).
13. MARTIN WATIENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1952-1988 1728 ( 1990) (presenting statistical evidence that party voting and identification declined from 1952 to
1980). Of course, the extent and significance of these changes has become, like the literature on the
decline of political parties generally, subject to debate. See BRUCE KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF
THE INDEPENDENT VOTER ( 1992).
14. See MARTIN WATIENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE CENTERED POLITICS 31- 46 ( 1991).
15. See LARRY SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMIT
TEES 1-27 ( 1984) (presenting numerous statistics showing the growth of PACs in the late 1970s and
early 1980s).
16. See generally NELSON W. POLSBY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM ( 1983) (analyz
ing the effect of the presidential nomination process reforms on the political system).
17. Of course, the "party" remains an important factor in many votes, especially those, since the
early 1980s, with symbolic or ideological overtones. See DAVID ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS
IN THE PosTMODERN HousE 14 ( 1991) (presenting an analysis of possible reasons for the resur
gence of partisan voting in the 1970s and 1980s). There is also evidence that party caucuses have
influence over voting. See G. Cox and M. McCubbins, Parties and Committees in the U.S. House of
Representatives ( 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal) . It is
unclear, however, to what extent the increase in polarized voting during the 1980s was caused by a
significant return to party control per se, as distinguished from a change in preferences along party
lines, i.e., a more ideologically polarized public and Congress. See Keith Kriebel, Where's the
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B . DECISIONMAKING IN A DECENTRALIZED CONGRESS

Given the formal decentralization of authority in Congress, and the appar
ent weakness of parties and the Speaker as means of informal control, how
does Congress respond to electoral pressures and interest group influence?
The new political theory has shown that policymaking in decentralized, ma
jority rule legislatures should be, absent intervention, inherently uncertain
and, perhaps, unstable. 18 One important school of thought argues that, in
response to this instability, members will fashion a governing system of com
mittees and subcommittees that institutionalizes a process of reciprocity and
deference among members. This idea is described in the formal political the
ory literature as the "norm of universalism" and more informally known as
logrolling or "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours." 19 To operation
alize such legislative behavior, congressional committees are given extensive
control over the individual policy areas under their jurisdiction, and defer
ence is shown by all members to the committees' decisions to bring, or not to
bring, legislation to the floor. 20
The norm of universalism can be politically beneficial to members of Con
gress for at least two reasons. First, the expected benefits flowing to a district
from being part of a legislature governed by the norm of universalism typi
cally will be higher over the long run than the expected benefits resulting
Party? (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal). More funda
mentally, whatever the change over time, parties have markedly less control in Congress today than
in the British political system, or in other countries with a strong party tradition. See BRUCE CAIN
ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 20611 (1987).
For a general discussion in the legal literature on the influence of parties, see, e.g., Michael A .
Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions,
88 MICH. L. REv. 9 17 (1990); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on
Civic R epublicanism, 97 Y ALE L. J. 1651 (1988); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political
Party Perspective on Civic Virtue R eforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988)
[hereinafter Fitts, The Vices of Virtue]; Jonathan Macey, The Role of the Democratic and R epubli
can Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REv. I (1990).
18. See generally McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Impli
cations for Agenda Control, 16 J. EcoN. THEORY 472 (1976) (building on Arrow's theorem to show
that changing the agenda-setter may dictate outcome).
19. For an excellent overview of this literature, see Melissa Collie, The Legislature and Distribu
tive Policy Making in Formal Perspective, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427 (1988). For the first formal
postulations of the argument, see Barry Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective in Congressional
Norms, 23 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 245 (1979). For its most careful articulation, see Emerson Niou &
Peter Ordeshook, Universalism in Congress, AM. J. PoL. SCI. 246 (1985).
This literature has its intellectual roots in Lowi's important distinction between distributive (that
is, domestic projects and tax favors) and redistributive (that is, social insurance and the structure of
tax rates) policies and the possible need to develop separate models of the political process for each
class of policies. See Theodore Lowi, A merican Business, Public Policy, Case-studies, and Political
Theory, !6 WORLD PoL. 677 (1964).
20. The importance of committees and the informal rules governing member behaviors for imple
menting the "norm of universalism" is argued in Weingast & Marshall, supra note 10, at 143-55.
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from an unstructured decentralized legislature ruled by a series of random
minimum winning coalitions.2 1 As public choice experts have detailed, a
multimember majority rule body making decisions involving more than one
policy dimension-for example, selecting public projects for each of 435 con
gressional districts-faces, in the absence of intervention, policy cycling of
minimum winning coalitions.22 There is no single, stable majority in decen
tralized legislatures. Individual legislators and their constituents face uncer
tain prospects: will they be in or out of any winning coalition? If they are in
the winning coalition, the legislator's local constituencies receive net benefits
from the adopted policies. If they are out, then their constituencies still pay
a share of the total tax costs of the majority's approved policies, but their
local projects-even economically efficient ones-are likely to be minimized,
if not eliminated. For local constituencies, it is better to have your legislator
in than out. But in a decentralized legislature, where there are no organizing
structures such as strong political parties that would carry a stable majority
on most budgetary issues, there are no stable, minimally winning coalitions.
Over the long run, each legislator faces the very real prospect of being ex
cluded from the fifty-one percent majority about half the time.23
Which legislative environment-universalism or minimum winning coali
tion-is likely to be more beneficial to legislators and their constituents over
time? If local project benefits are large enough to exceed the costs of the
average project, then universalism will be preferred.24 The intuition is
straightforward. Under minimum winning coalition politics, each district
can expect to pay slightly more than half of the average project's cost every
legislative session (because slightly more than half of all projects are ap
proved, but all districts share in costs), and each district has slightly better
than a fifty-fifty chance of being included in the winning coalition and receiv
ing its full local benefits. Expected net benefits are therefore slightly more
than (.5)(NB), where NB equals local benefits minus average project costs.
Under universalism, however, all local projects are approved: "You scratch
my back, I'll scratch yours." Thus, each district receives its local benefits
21. See Weingast, supra note 19, at 252.
22. A good review of these problems is found in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 38
(1989); Robert Inman, Markets, Government, and the 'New' Political Economy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 647, 663-71 (Alan Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).
23. If all 51% majority, minimum winning coalitions are equally likely, then the chance that a
single legislator will be in the majority is (N + 1)!2N, where N is the number of legislators in the
legislature. See Weingast, supra note 19, at 246-49. Thus, a given legislator is "in" or "out" of
about one-half of all majorities which form.
24. The implicit assumption here, and below, is that our legislators are not risk takers. Risk
takers might well prefer a small, one-time chance at a big win, even when a smaller stream of net
benefits is a sure thing over the long-run. In contrast to the typical career legislator who is most
concerned about his long-run prospects, a legislator who sees politics as a temporary opportunity
might well be such a risk taker.
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and pays the average project. Expected benefits become just NB. If local
benefits are greater than average project costs, then universalism has a higher
expected net gain to each congressional district over the long run.25
Second, even when expected local project benefits for their districts are less
than, or equal to, average project costs, the norm of universalism can be
rationally preferred by legislators and their constituents to minimum coali
tion politics. In this case, even though universalism costs more than it re
turns in project benefits, it does "smooth" the flow of net fiscal benefits to the
districts. Rather than uncertain and possibly large swings between periods of
fiscal gains and losses as legislators move randomly into and out of minimum
winning coalitions, universalism gives legislators and their constituents a
steady stream of known fiscal outcomes. Indeed, it can be perfectly rational
for individual legislators to prefer a constant stream of small net losses to
uncertain swings that, though offering some periods of gains, also impose
2 5 . The precise development of these results for the special case where all districts have the same
size project can be found in Niou & Ordeshook, supra note 19. It is straightforward to generalize
their conclusions to variable project sizes.
The focus in the original universalism research on identical projects of fixed size has created some
unnecessary confusion in the political science literature as to what the condition of local benefits
greater than average project costs really means. Some critics of the universalism theory take this
condition to mean that when local benefits exceed average project costs, local projects are economi
cally efficient. They then argue that the norm of universalism cannot be used to explain inefficient
pork barrel politics. For a useful summary of this criticism and the several attempts to circumvent
it, see Collie, supra note 19, at 433-34.
In our extended model with variable project sizes, this criticism does not apply. First, and most
importantly, the criticism confuses any positive aggregate surplus (benefits greater than costs) with
the maximum possible surplus. Economic efficiency demands the maximum possible surplus.
Projects whose aggregate benefits are greater than aggregate costs need not be efficient projects
maximizing the difference between aggregate benefits and costs. See infra Part II.c.1. Second, once
we allow for districts to have different sized projects it is certainly possible for a majority of legisla
tors to prefer universalism, even when their own project benefits minus own project costs are nega
tive. What is needed for universalism to be preferred by a legislator is that his own project benefits
exceed average project costs. Thus, if the distribution of project sizes is skewed toward a majority of
very expensive projects leaving a minority of inexpensive projects, universalism can still be the
majority's rationally preferred norm. The theory of universalism, once extended to allow for varia
ble project sizes, allows for project inefficiencies in a very standard way; Figure 1 below presents the
arguments. See infra Part I.e.!.
Variable project sizes also protects the theory of universalism from the arguments of John Fer
ejohn, Morris Fiorina, and Richard McKelvey. See John Ferejohn et al., Sophisticated Voting and
A genda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting, 31 AM. J. PoL Sci. 169 (1987). While not
presented as a critique of universalism, their work shows that minimum winning coalitions are the
natural outcome in open agenda legislative settings, provided project sizes are fixed. In fact, they
show that there is only one winning minimum coalition likely, and it will be the coalition of those
districts with the cheapest projects. !d. at 178. Their arguments do not apply when projects are of
variable size, however, since in their legislature all districts will have an incentive to reduce their
projects so as to be included in the cheapest minimum winning coalition. Only very small projects
giving zero net benefits will survive under minimum winning coalition politics. Thus, if anything,
the open agenda, minimum winning coalition game presented by Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey
makes universalism even more attractive!

... ,
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large losses. In effect, universalism serves an insurance function by allowing
legislators to protect themselves and their constituents against the political
risk that they will be excluded from the narrow, winning coalition. Quite
apart from our first argument above, therefore, universalism can be preferred
if legislators and their constituents are risk averse, and value smooth, rather
than widely variable, streams of net benefits from the public sector. 26
These two arguments for universalism are not mutually exclusive, of
course, and in fact their two benefits are additive. As noted above, risk
averse legislators who have local benefits less than average project costs may
prefer universalism because the benefits from fiscal "smoothing" outweigh
their average fiscal losses. But note too that with universalism, risk averse
legislators who have local project benefits that exceed average project costs
also get the added benefit from fiscal smoothing, adding to the attractiveness
of universalism.
Finally, and importantly, if the norm of universalism is known to be indi
vidually preferred by a majority of legislators, then all members will have an
incentive to accept that norm when they conduct their own legislative busi
ness. If a majority is going to play universalistically, then there is no incen
tive for the minority not to go along. No single legislator has an incentive to
defect given that defection may only lead to the possible exclusion of their
own projects from the universalistic budgetY In a universalistic Congress
then, the operative, informal rule which governs domestic fiscal policymak
ing becomes: "You accept my local projects, and I'll accept yours."
It is the congressional committee structure that has come in many cases to
facilitate this informal, universalistic norm of reciprocity between the mem
bers of Congress. Early public choice models of Congress envisioned legisla
tors coming together in one omnibus bill covering all relevant legislation. 28
However, because most legislation on individual areas is passed piecemeal,
and because no legally binding contracting device between legislators can
exist outside a constitutional amendment, such explicit deal making is ordi
narily impossible. To fill this contracting void, members are thought to ere26. This insurance argument requires legislators--or their constituents-to be risk averse. Risk
aversion requires a diminishing marginal utility of net gains from fiscal policy. With diminishing
marginal utility, large fiscal losses hurt constituents more than equal amounts of fiscal gains benefit
them. Because of this insurance function some legislators might either receive a greater benefit from
a system of universalism that already provides positive net district benefits, or vote for a system of
universalism that provides a smaller, but steady, stream of net fiscal losses.
Of course, where all legislators are in a position of receiving net fiscal losses from universalism,
the rational thing to do is to avoid these small steady losses altogether. This could be done by
prohibiting Congress from budgeting whenever each district's expected net benefits from fiscal pol
icy are negative. In reality, however, it may be very difficult to enforce such prohibitions.
27. See Niou & Ordeshook, supra note 19, at 249-52.
28. See JAMES BUCHANAN & GEORGE TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 131-45 (1962)
(discussing majority voting models and logrolling).

-
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ate informal agreements through the committee structure: a general rule of
deference to committee choices. This rule ensures reciprocity as each repre
sentative's pet project is forwarded to the floor. Committee autonomy is the
coin facilitating the informal trade. 2 9 In David Mayhew's famous descrip
tion of a decentralized Congress, "if a group of planners sat down and tried
to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving
members' electoral needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed to
improve on what exists."30
Unfortunately, as we show below, there is a cost to this system: there is no
assurance that the projects being pushed by committees promote efficient al
locations or redistribution. On the contrary, the incentives within universal
ism open Congress to strategic behavior by members and their committees to
push for too expensive projects, and projects that benefit only their own con
stituents. Given the difference in distribution of benefits flowing from dis
trict-specific projects versus national programmatic legislation, which is
more likely to represent legislative collective goods, legislators have an incen
tive to emphasize the former in their committee work and attempt to free
ride on their colleagues' efforts for the latter.3 1 The end result may be an
economically inefficient and distributionally regressive domestic budget.
Certainly, the model of congressional behavior outlined here is stylized, as
all models must be, and does not incorporate any role for ideological or civi
cally virtuous conduct or for party or committee leadership. 32 It does cap29 . For the details of the argument, see Weingast & Marshall, supra note 10 , at 143-48 . Of
course, this is not the only possible function for congressional committees. The same institutional
structures can serve the ends of minimum winning coalitions too. See FENNO, supra note 12, at 8 1 1 38 (describing individual Appropriations Committee members' expectations and the structure for
decisionmaking); STEWART, supra note 11, at 3-52 (describing how committees may play a unifica
tion role for passing legislation).
30. DAVID A. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 8 1- 8 2 ( 1 97 4).
31 . See generally MORRIS FlORIN A,
5 8-63 ( 1989 ); MAYHEW, supra

CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTABLISH

note 30. Similarly, in monitoring this system, constituents
have more of an incentive to evaluate their representatives based on their individual work for the
district (particularly, localized benefits such as pork barrel legislation and constituency servicing),
and less on any of the broad programmatic legislative activity that is commonly associated by lawyers with the constitutional role of Congress. The responsibility for the broad programmatic activities that cut across district lines is more obscure in a multimember body. A universalistic system is
viewed as successful, it should be emphasized, because neither representatives nor constituents have
an individual incentive once the process is begun to respond in their individual capacity to the high
cost of those goods and services-a cost that is due in part to the necessary support this system
demands for the (relatively) inefficient projects pushed by other representatives who are part of the
informal deal. The arrangement is supposedly an individually rational response to the collective
action problems of group representation.
32. Obviously, these wider values may play an important role in political decisionmaking, but so
do the constituent motives we explore here. Determining which incentives dominate representative
behavior in particular cases can be resolved only empirically. See, e.g., John Hird, The Political
Economy of Pork: Project Selection and the U.S. A rmy Corps of Engineers, 8 5 AM. PoL. Sci. REV.
429 ( 1 99 1 ) (showing ideological measures of representatives' preferences had no effect on the receipt
MENT
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ture, however, some, perhaps much, of what drives Congress on many
domestic fiscal policy issues. 33 Moreover, it correctly focuses attention on
the structure of Congress and its potentially negative impact on legislation.
This is and should be of concern to all, regardless of political perspective.
C. EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF A DECENTRALIZED CONGRESS

As discussed above, the fiscal consequences of a decentralized Congress
acting under a norm of universalism are problematic at best. While this is
not the place to undertake an extended technical and theoretical discussion
of the likely consequences of a system of universalism, any model of reform
needs to be understood in light of the important policy problems with this
process. Therefore, before presenting our model, this section reviews the evi
dence that universalistic domestic budgets are economically inefficient. Fur
ther, we suggest such budgets are unlikely to do much to equalize the
allocation of societal resources; if anything, the evidence suggests that recent
universalistic Congresses have made our tax code less progressive, not more.
Finally, standing perhaps as a compensating benefit, universalistic Con
gresses do appear to produce greater political equality between representa
tives in Congress. We are doubtful, however, that such equality in Congress
does much to enhance the more fundamental political values of checking
tyranny or encouraging diversity of views. We consider each of these points
in turn.
1 . Fiscal Efficiency
The efficiency consequences of universalism and its institutions can be sig
nificant. The incentives to overuse the decentralized budgetary system can
be shown both on an abstract level and empirically . Figure 1 illustrates the
likely outcome for fiscal policymaking when public budgets are divisible
across legislative districts and fiscal policy is decided under a norm of
universalism. The downward sloping schedule b(g) in Figure 1 measures the
marginal benefits of local projects g to constituents in a typical legislative
district (e.g., dams, military bases, urban grants, agricultural subsidies, tax
or size of federal water project allocations); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology
in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 279 ( 1984); Robert Inman, The Political
Economy of TRA '86, (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal)
(showing the ideological inclinations of legislators matter when defining the progressivity of the tax
code but that constituent motives largely determine which universalistic tax loopholes are to be
closed); John E. Jackson & John W. Kinder, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes
(1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
33. See Collie supra note 19, at 446-49; Robert Inman, Federal Assistance and Local Services in
the United States: The Evolution of a New Federalist Fiscal Order, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: Q UAN
TITATIVE STUDIES 33, 56-67 (Harvey Rosen ed., 1988) (presenting economic model showing how

individual representatives have an incentive to bring federal spending to their district, even if ineffi
cient for the country as a whole); Inman, supra note 32.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

1748

[Vol. 80: 1737

I

1

FIGURE 1
BUDGETING WITHIN A DECENTRALIZED LEGISLATURE

J,

j
i

�I
i

j

$
Project
Benefits
and
Costs

� b(g)
w

m(g)

m

A

<Pm
B

0

I
I
-- 1
F I
I
I
I

I
lc
l--I
I
I
I

E

D

G

g=u

g=p
Project

C/N

<Pm(g)
g

Size

incentives). The horizontal curve at m
m (g) measures the constant margi
nal social costs of providing g in that district. Also shown in Figure 1 is the
district's own tax share of these marginal costs, denoted by the lower line,
</Jm. The district tax share <P is typically a small fraction, perhaps as low as
1 IN, when N is the number of congressional districts and citizens share the
burden of government spending roughly proportionally.
Assuming local projects have only local benefits, the socially efficient pro
vision of such projects to the district will be p in Figure 1, where marginal
benefits equal full marginal costs: b(g)
m (g). Under the norm of univer
salism, however, local projects totalling size u will typically be selected. At
level u, marginal benefits equal the district's marginal costs, </Jm: b(g)
</Jm(g) . Since under universalism all districts defer to each others' individu
ally chosen project sizes-"you approve my projects, and I'll approve
yours"-the final federal project budget will be simply the sum of all spend
ing provided in each district, that is, Lmu . Constituents in each district must
now pay their share of the total tax costs of the project budget. For a typical
district which pays (approximately) 1 IN of all taxes this equals 1 IN of the
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�mu budget or approximately mu; u IS the average sized project (il
2-u/N) .
The net economic benefits t o each district under the norm of universalism
equals district benefits minus district taxes. For the average district in Figure
u) this equals the area under the Figure's benefit curve (or
1 (that is, il
area [W + A + B + C + D + G]) minus the area under the Figure's cost
curve (or area [A + B + C + D + E + F +G]). Net benefits for this
average district are therefore measured by the area [W - (E + F)] . While
net benefits in Figure 1 are positive-[W - (E + F)] > 0-as drawn, they
are smaller than what could be achieved (area W) were each district to sub
mit its efficient project of size p. The difference in net benefits between the
efficient (p) and inefficient (u) project budgets-measured here by the area
[E + F] for the average district in Figure l-is defined as the excess burden
of the budget's overprovision of domestic projects.
Thus, decentralized congressional budgets fashioned under a norm of uni
versalism should dictate inefficiently large projects of size u in every district,
an outcome that the recent empirical evidence seems to confirm. 34
=

=

2.

Fiscal Equity

That congressional universalism would lead to economic inefficiencies is,
on reflection, quite logical, since universalism, like all cost sharing schemes,
creates incentives to over utilize. What is perhaps surprising, however, is
that universalistic cost sharing among all districts is unlikely to lead to real
income redistribution.
As noted above, universalism seeks to ensure that no individual legislators
or geographically based interest groups are excluded from any final winning
coalition. Although there are clear inefficiencies resulting from this process,
it could be argued that the norm of universalism might be accepted by legis
lators ex ante because of its more egalitarian distributional effects. 35 From
this argument we might conclude the economic inefficiencies of universalism
are the socially agreed upon cost for greater economic equality.
On closer analysis, however, it should be clear that the inefficiencies of
universalism described above cannot be justified on the basis of income redis
tribution. There are several reasons that universalism is not likely to be pro
gressive as compared to its most likely alternatives. 36 First, as a logical
34. See Inman, supra note 33, at 68; Leonard Shabman & G.
R esponsibility for Coastal Port Development, 6 PoL. STUD. REV.

Edward Dickey, Federal Financial
358 (1986); Hird, supra note 32, at
446, tbl. 8, (estimating a $3.58 billion inefficiency from congressional water project selection).
35. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 183-92 (1971).
36. A progressive fiscal system is defined as one whose taxes as a percent of family income rise as
income rises and/or whose expenditure benefits as a percent of family income decline as income
rises. Such a system is likely to lead to a more equal distribution of societal resources. A propor
tional fiscal system is defined as one whose taxes and benefits are a constant fraction of family

•
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matter, it is important to recognize that universalism only serves to ensure
relative equality among political districts in the distribution of political re
sources, not relative equality among income groups. As noted above, univer
salism in its pure form offers each political district its own equal share of
political resources, but how those resources are distributed within districts
among income groups is left open.
Of course, one might hope that funds, once local, would then be distrib
uted on a progressive basis across income groups. But there is nothing in the
structure of universalism that leads to such a prediction. Indeed, to the ex
tent that local governments make the ultimate decisions about how the gov
ernment largesse is distributed within their districts, there are competitive
reasons to believe they will be forced to target those resources to wealthier
residents, who are disproportionately more mobile and bring more economic
resources to the district. Dispersed competitive organizations37 face serious
problems in redistributing income, at least over the long run. 3 8
Nor is it likely, as a second point, that a norm of universalism would nec
essarily lead to greater progressivity at the point when federal tax rates are
(initially) being formulated. The argument that a norm of universalism
might further federal tax progressivity presumes that a more equal division
of political resources is inherent in the norm. Further, it assumes this in
creased political equality must undo common law inequalities in initial in
comes and lead to agreement on a more equal distribution of social resources,
namely, a more progressive federal tax code. As discussed above, however, a
universalistic tax agreement-assuming it could be achieved-would only
equalize the incidence of taxes between districts, not necessarily between
individuals. 39
Finally, and more fundamentally, there is a practical difficulty in even
specifying a universalistic tax norm which might govern the formulation of
overall tax rates. Even if a universalistic agreement were somehow to be
attempted between voters, rather than the representatives of districts, voters
who know their "common law incomes" might find it impossible to reach
income. Finally, a regressive fiscal system is defined as one whose taxes as a percent of family
income fal l ag income rises and/or whose expenditure benefits as a percent of family income rise as
income rises. A regressive fiscal system is likely to lead to a less equal distribution of societal
resources.
3 7 . Dispersed competitive organizations are nonhierarchical, competitive organizational
structures.
3 8 . See Richard Briffault, Localism: Part 11-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
346, 420 ( 1 990) (arguing that economic theory ignores interpersonal inequality of mobility, produc
ing a theory biased in favor of business and the affluent); Robert Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equality, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1 663, 1 67 5 ( 1 979) (arguing that judicial
attempts to reform local government financing are undercut by substantial income variations and
families' abilities to relocate).
39. Inman & Fitts, supra note 2, at 83-92.
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consensus. The formulation of an initial structure of tax rates is fundamen
tally a zero sum game, with some participants necessarily worse off as the
result of any agreement, as compared to their preexisting property and distri
butional rights. This conflict creates the classic problem of cycling and stale
mate in a dispersed political system, and makes it more likely that
government will leave common law distributions in effect. Thus, paradoxi
cally, if the relatively poor attempt to make use of their new, greater leverage
in the voting market,40 cycling and stalemate will tend to retard redistribu
tion. The ultimate progressivity of a system dependent on the adoption of
universalistic norms for government action is therefore questionable.4 1
In light of these effects, the empirical evidence suggests that geographically
decentralized political structures in general, and universalistic type agree
ments in particular, do not necessarily redistribute resources from the rich to
the poor. Rather, as the word suggests, universalistic agreements tend
merely to distribute resources between broad geographically based constitu
ent interest groups. In particular, studies of specific federal programs have
shown no real redistribution resulting from universalistic agreements cover
ing water projects and federal grant programs,42 food stamps,43 or tax loop
holes generally.44 As John Ferejohn notes at the end of his study of
redistribution in a decentralized Congress:
[T]he overall distributions of income and wealth are not much affected by
the mechanisms of redistribution employed in American politics . . . [be
cause] . . . coalitions must be formed in the context of a political institution
that divides its workload among committees and subcommittees of special
ists . . . . In this setting the three general methods that could be used to
develop supporting coalitions in Congress-building a broad clientele
through program benefits, logrolling, and appealing to shared partisan or
ideological values--do not offer much possibility of creating stable political

40. Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63,
108-15 (1990).
41. In addition to the structural reasons noted in the text, universalism may also retard greater
progressivity for what economists would probably categorize as a transaction cost or focal point
effect. Members of a dispersed legislative body organized according to a geographically based
universalistic norm will tend to find it more difficult to organize or focus on nongeographic-based
issues and divisions-specifically, those distributional issues that divide the rich and poor. These
broad issues not only necessitate the formation of entirely new cross-cutting coalitions involving
larger but more diffuse groups, but they may also undermine the norm of universalism because no
universalistic distributional agreement is possible when groups are competing over a set amount of
resources.

42.
43.

Hird, supra note

44.

Inman & Fitts, supra note

32;

Inman, supra note

33,

at

68.

John Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legisla
tion, in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE 223, 250-52 (Gerald Wright et al. eds., 1 986).
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su p port for effective redistributive programs. 45
3.

Political Equality

While more equal distribution of federal funds to districts may not further
economic redistribution of resources among economic classes, or improve al
locative efficiency, it does appear to produce, at least at first blush, greater
political equality among representatives in Congress. What types of social
values might this protect? Though there are two that require discussion,
neither, in our view, serves to justify the current system of decentralized deci
sionmaking, especially given the potentially negative distributional and effi
ciency effects outlined above.
First, like the standard rationale put forward for checks and balances in
our political system, universalism might be viewed as a means for avoiding
political tyranny-a future Adolf Hitler. 46 To make this type of assertion,
the alternative system supplanted by universalism would need to be quite
extreme political centralization. In other words, there must be a realistic
possibility of tyranny in our political system of checks and balances.
Apart from its possible protection against tyranny, universalism might also
further the separate and independent value of political diversity-namely,
increasing the power of diverse social and ethnic communities as their repre
sentatives become part of any universalistic deals. Diversity, as used in this
sense, refers to a political system that offers the public a variety of social
communities and ideals from which to choose, beyond what they currently
prefer. Because today's public may not appreciate the need to retain view
points that it will only come to understand and accept in the future, it might
be argued, standard efficiency criteria based on current preferences (even
preferences about the value of diversity) should not govern decisionmaking,
even under a traditional economic analysis. 47 Under this reasoning only the
future can determine whether diversity vindicates preferences. From this
perspective, we might want to provide some interest groups with even greater
power than they have under our current system, and, reciprocally, less influ
ence for at least some more majoritarian and diffuse interests.
While we too embrace the value of political equality and the need to con
trol tyranny and foster diversity, these important values do not appear deci45. John Ferejohn, Congress and Redistribution, in MAKING ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONG RESS
1 5 1 (Alan Schick ed., 1 983).
46. Some economists might consider tyranny as a variant on the distributional issue, in the sense
that political tyranny may ultimately lead to regressive economic policies in favor of the ruling elite.
We believe, however, that it should be treated separately as a fi rst order issue of political equality.
47. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 2 1 9- 43 ( 1 9 84); Mark Kelman, Choice and Util
ity. 1 9 79 W1s. L. REv. 769, 779 (arguing that it is illogical to say that what one chooses necessarily
makes one better off).
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sive with respect to the policy issues under review here, namely, controlling
universalism in congressional budgeting decisions. First, the issues of tyr
anny and diversity do not present themselves as directly in the budgetary
context as they do in other areas of governmental policy. For the most part,
such values of political equality tend not to be amenable to, and thus are
often not furthered by, a norm of equal geographic influence such as univer
salism in the budgetary process; instead, they more often arise in the passage
of substantive law implementing specific diversity goals. In particular, the
current system of universalism in budgeting does not really further racial and
ethnic diversity in the sense commonly used, nor does it prove to be a very
important factor in preventing government tyranny of the type associated
with episodes such as Watergate or Irangate, let alone a future racist dicta
tor. Indeed, with respect to political tyranny, not only might a legislative
body acting under a universalistic norm tend not to confront potential
threats of executive tyranny, but there are other structural devices, such as
strong political parties or the judiciary, that would prevent tyranny more
directly.
Second, as a general matter, our political system already provides many
protections for narrower groups, either in the form of checks and balances,
separation of powers, or direct judicial intervention. Because such groups
may also enjoy numerous collective action advantages in the private organi
zational process, our current political system seems to be too heavily influ
enced by many narrow groups, that is, undermined by a tyranny of the
minority.4 8 Indeed, our own earlier writing has attempted to give some mea
sure of the efficiency loss, in some contexts, predicated on a utilitarian justifi
cation for such decentralization.49 While there are individual instances
where diverse interests should be afforded greater influence based on norma
tive criteria which our legal culture would easily accept (tyranny of the ma
jority can and does exist in many particular contexts), as a systemic matter it
is unclear that the influence of such groups should be generally enhanced
within Congress, and few, if any, scholars currently argue that the power of
such groups should be strengthened across the board.
Finally, the system of universalism creates incentives for actors to avoid
conflict, and in this sense can be viewed as inherently conservative. As we
noted above, one of the asserted benefits of universalism is that it avoids
conflict by equalizing the distribution of resources among relevant political
4 8 . See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 7 1 3 ( 1 9 84)
(Carotene Products approach to j udicial interpretation in the political process, intended to protect
minority rights, is outdated because it focuses on minorities who have gained political bargaining
power); Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review, 1 0 1
YALE L.J. 3 1 ( 1 99 1) (surveying literature proposing change i n judicial review based o n interest
group theory).
49. I nman & Fitts, supra note 2, at 8 3 -92.
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actors and granting each group internal control over the distribution of those
resources within their relevant political domains. There are advantages in
avoiding conflict, but universalism elevates this goal into a general system of
policymaking within government. In effect, it gives locally elected represent
atives and their supporters an unchallenged property right to control the al
location of public dollars to their districts. In those circumstances in which
government needs to respond with bold new initiatives, or to redistribute
resources from the rich to the poor, a Congress acting under a norm of uni
versalism surely would not offer the quickest and best response.
4. Consent

Finally, some might suggest universalism is justified merely on the grounds
of consent: our representatives have voted for it. Whatever its distributional
or allocative effects, our representatives, according to this reasoning, must
have concluded the process is socially beneficial.
The value of universalism cannot be presumed from its mere existence,
however. There is clearly a great deal of disquiet in the public and Congress
itself over the political process we have described. While voters accept the
behavior of their individual representatives, they do not necessarily endorse
the overall system of congressional decisionmaking. In effect, universalism
may represent an individually, but not socially, rational response to the needs
of legislative decisionmaking. For this reason there have been numerous at
tempts over the past few years to create institutions to eliminate or overcome
universalism in particular contexts, with occasional success. 5 0 Indeed, we
envision ourselves as contributing to this literature and effort.
To summarize, universalism, at least in the form described here, does not
appear to be a very attractive decisionmaking process. As a general matter it
has negative efficiency consequences and no clear distributional advantages.
Moreover, it is necessary neither to the pursuit of diverse policy viewpoints,
nor to the avoidance of political tyranny. And to the extent we believe more
needs to be done in our current system to pursue these latter goals, there are
other methods for achieving them.
This analysis leads inevitably to the next question: what mechanisms exist
for overcoming universalism in Congress? Political institutions that central
ize political authority, and improve the contracting mechanisms in Congress,
appear to provide the clearest avenue for productive reform. As noted above,
however, the two entities that historically served this function, centralized
committees in Congress and political parties, appear to have diminished in
50. See supra notes 7-8.
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importance.5 1 I n this paper, therefore, we turn to the potential role of the
President, the one formally centralized institution of governance, as a possi
ble source for alleviating some of the negative effects of a universalistic
Congress.
In the analysis that follows, we first examine the resources and tactics a
President might employ to reform domestic fiscal decisionmaking in Con
gress. While the model we develop is, like all models, an ideal type, we be
lieve it captures and isolates much of what is going on in presidential
influence in this context. Using our formal analysis, we then show how Pres
ident Reagan did, and President Carter did not, follow our proposed strate
gies for influencing congressional decisionmaking. Despite their similar
goals for budgetary reform, only President Reagan was able to make a signifi
cant step toward constraining the universalistic fiscal pressures within our
currently decentralized Congress.
II. THE PRESIDENCY AND FISCAL POLICY: WHERE'S THE INFLUENCE?
The existing literature on the formal powers of the Presidency suggest that
the office should be inherently weak in legislative matters as compared to the
constitutional powers granted to the Congress. 52 The new positive political
theory has demonstrated, and recent empirical evidence seems to confirm,
that the President's one formal, constitutional tool of influence-the veto-is
of limited use when members of Congress have clearly established policy
preferences. 53 Only when the President's own policy preferences lie "close
enough" to the prior and established preferences of one-third of the members
5 1 . See supra notes 1 2- 1 8 and accompanying text. See generally NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, CoN
G RESS IN CHANGE ( 1 97 5) (describing changes in Congress, institutionally and generally).
52. The President's only significant formal power is the veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 . Beyond
this, the President's formal authority is limited to her right to convene and adjourn both houses,
and to recommend legislation. Id. art. I I , § 3. For a summary of the arguments and evidence on
presidential weakness in legislative affairs, see JON BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, THE PRESIDENT
IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA ( 1 990).
53. David Schap presents perhaps the most complete treatment of the standard public choice
analysis of presidential veto authority. See David Schap, In Search of Efficacious Veto A u thority, 5 8
Pus. CHOICE 247 ( 1 9 88). This analysis takes the preference positions o f t h e legislature and the
President as given, and shows that: ( l ) presidential influence is limited by the congruence of presi
dential preferences with those of a potential veto support group in Congress; (2) a forward-looking
legislature will always force the President to near indifference between the legislative alternative and
the current status quo (or reversion); and, (3) while there are veto threats, no veto actuall y occurs.
The current formal theory seems to argue for an impotent executive.
Recent empirical analysis finds that the mere availability of the veto has little effect on the ability
of executives to control spending, but in certain circumstances-namely, an item veto with a veto
sustaining coalition-the veto can be effective. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Line Item Veto and
Public Sector Budgets, 36 J. OF PuB. EcoN. 269, 289-90 ( 1 988). Importantly, the effect is always to
reduce government spending and taxation-results consistent with our findings and model. See
gen erally Inman & Fitts, supra note 2.
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of Congress, and she is willing to compromise, can she expect to have much
influence. Unfortunately, if congressional preferences place the President
and most members of Congress at opposite ends of the policy spectrum-as
is likely when Congress budgets under the norm of universalism-then the
formal veto by itself is not likely to have much, if any, effect on final budget
outcomes.
Despite the limitations on formal veto powers suggested in this literature,
however, Presidents do appear to have informal influence over Congress that
can change the design of fiscal policy. Roosevelt's introduction of social in
surance, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations' successful passage of health
insurance and the war on poverty, and Reagan's major reforms of domestic
spending and taxes are each possible examples of presidential impact on fiscal
policy. What informal sources of influence might Presidents draw upon that
explain these and other successes? While the President's leadership of the
party structure and so-called coattail effect on the election of congressional
candidates may have declined,54 some believe these party factors may still
give the President an ability to attract support from congressional party lead
ers and membership on the margin. 55 In addition, the P resident's access to
the media, 56 direction of executive branch appointments and decisions, 57
control over the political and public agenda, 5 8 personal popularity, 59 and in
tangible leadership skills60 can be a source of influence over Congress. Using
these devices, Presidents can be "less or more adroit in exploiting the oppor
tunities or overcoming the adversities afforded by the times in which they
served. " 6 1
Both of these perspectives, one emphasizing the President's formal powers
and the other focusing on informal resources, have merit. What is needed is
a theory of Presidential influence which attempts to combine the insights of
both literatures, showing how the formal power of the veto can be combined
54. See JEROME CLUBB ET. AL., PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: VOTERS, PARTIES, AND GOVERN
MENT I N AMERICAN H ISTORY 5 5 - 6 1 ( 1 980).
55. See generally MARK PETERSON, LEGISLATING TOGETHER 1 3 1 ( 1 990).
56. See generally SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHI P ( 1 9 86).
57. See PETERSON, supra note 55, at 87-89.
58. See JOHN KINGDON, AGENDA ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICI ES 2 5-28 ( 1 984).
59. See Terry Sullivan, Presiden tial Leadership in Congress: Securing Com m itments, in CoN
GRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 286, 299-305 (Matthew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds. , 1 98 7);
John Woolley, Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto, 35 AM. J . PoL. SCI. 279,
299-300 ( 1 99 1 ); see generally Douglas Rivers and Nancy Rose, Passing the Presiden t 's Program:
Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress, 29 AM. J. PoL. S C I . 1 8 3 ( 1 9 85).
60. See RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS ( 1 990).
6 1 . PETERSON, supra note 55, at 3 1 . See also Terry Sullivan, Headcounts, Expectations, and
Presiden tial Coalitions in Congress, 32 AM. J . PoL. Sci. 67 ( 1 988); Terry Sullivan, The Bank Ac
count Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal Path of Presidential Influence, 3 5
AM. J . POL. SCI. 6 7 ( 1 99 1 ) .
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with informal congressional and electoral-based resources to give the Presi
dent the power to lead policy reforms. This will be our task here: to offer a
theory of the President's potential influence over domestic fiscal policies.
Part I l . A . shows how informal presidential resources might be used to
fashion presidential coalitions from initially reluctant legislators. Part Il.B
then illustrates how the influence of these informal coalitions can be lever
aged through the formal powers of the presidential veto to induce even major
fiscal reforms. In other words, informal presidential resources plus the exec
utive's formal veto powers can be combined to coax welfare-improving fiscal
policies from inefficient legislatures. At the right moment and for the right
reasons, the President does have influence. 62
A. PRESIDENTIAL R ESOURCES A N D FORMING COALITIONS

The dilemma facing a contemporary President seeking to affect fiscal pol
icy in a decentralized, universalistic Congress is that the President has no
natural allies. Each member of Congress is assumed to pursue the specific,
special interests of his or her constituency, which, when aggregated, give us
the universalistic and economically inefficient budgets illustrated by Figure
1. 63 If the President should find an electoral mandate in an agenda that seeks
to control these fiscal inefficiencies, that agenda would call for cuts in federal
government spending from Figure 1 's congressionally chosen level of u dol
lars per district to the presidentially preferred level of p dollars per district.
In this electoral environment, however, there is no obvious room to compro
mise between these extremes of u and p and no natural veto coalition upon
which the President may call to force a new policy agenda. The universalis
tic Congress spends too much on localized projects and taxes insufficiently
and inequitably. The President can criticize and point a finger, but without
some support in Congress itself, she can do nothing.
If a presidentially led policy change in a universalistic Congress is to oc
cur, therefore, the President must bring to the legislative arena new policy
resources that she, and she alone, controls. As we show below, with new
resources the President may be able to fashion a reform coalition within Con
gress for improved fiscal policy. At least three sources of presidential re
sources might be imagined.
First, and perhaps the most often mentioned resource, is the coattail effect
of popular Presidents. Despite the decline of party identification among the
United States public, reducing the President's automatic coattail effect on
members of her party, Presidents still have the ability to offer benefits to
62. The discussion that follows is an informal summary of the arguments presented in detail in
Robert Inman & Michael Fitts, Executive Influence Within Decentralized Legislatures: On Making
Better Fiscal Policies ( 1 992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
63. See supra Part I.e. I .
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particular representatives. Such benefits include giving public credit for their
individual assistance on major legislation, campaign appearances, and focus
ing media attention and positive exposure for selected representatives. 64
Constitutionally guaranteed and congressionally granted executive powers
provide two additional sources of presidential resources. First, the President
has agenda influence over nonfiscal policies of concern to congressional
members-e.g., the power to make judicial appointments-that permits the
President to "tilt" toward key members on social issues in exchange for sup
port for the President's fi s cal agenda. 6 5 In addition, the executive branch has
control over the implementation of congressional policies; coupled with the
inability of Congress to fully specify an executive action for all contingencies,
this leads to some executive discretion over the allocation of budget dollars,
government contracts, and the enforcement of economic and tax regulations
across members' constituencies. 66
Given these resources and the potential for reform, the President may allo
cate her scarce presidential resources6 7 to either of two "venues" of presiden64. See GEORGE EDWARDS, AT THE MARGIN: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN CONGRESS 2 1 9
( 1 989); Sullivan, supra note 59, at 299-305 .
6 5 . This is the trade of social policy for fiscal policy. To build their conservative coalitions in
Congress on fiscal affairs, Presidents Reagan and Bush (Bush in particular) may have used judicial
appointments favoring the conservative social agenda.
66. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET AND MATTHEW MCCUBBINS, THE LOGI C OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRJA TIONS PROCESS 22- 3 8 ( 1 99 1 ) . For a recent exam
ple of the President using executive discretion to influence political events, see Robin Toner, Warm
ing Up for the Primary, N . Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 4, 1 99 1 , at AS (comments of Nackey Loeb, publisher of
the Manchester Union Leader: "Call it coincidence but Washington is suddenly bestowing financial
benefits on our beleagued state.").
While the new positive political theory has presented persuasive evidence that Congress does hold
the executive on at least a partial leash through committee monitoring of agency decisions, even the
strongest proponents of the congressional control theory must admit to some executive discretion.
See generally Jerry Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical
Stories of Legal Development, 6 J . L . EcoN . & 0RG. 267 ( 1 990); Glen Robinson, Com mentary on
"Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies": Political Uses of Structure and
Process, 75 VA. L. R Ev. 483 ( 1 989). Generally, it has been shown that congressional oversight is
itself a scarce resource, and not all presidential actions can be monitored. Further, Congressional
oversight is backward looking, allowing the President to take preemptive actions that Congress may
not be able to undo.
Finally, Congress might actually desire discretionary presidential actions-and allocate the re
sources necessary to make them happen-precisely because those actions hold the potential to make
all the members' constituencies better off.
67. In the discussion that follows we shall find it convenient to assume all presidential resources
can be measured in dollars. Presidential control over fiscal allocations and regulatory rulings pro
vide direct economic benefits to favored districts and can easily be valued in dollar terms. The
dollar value of a presidential visit at election time (coattail resources), or j udicial appointments
likely to generate preferred decisions on social issues, are not so obvious. Nonetheless, representa
tives do find a personal metric that allows them to make choices between economic benefits and
political visits or "right-thinking" judicial appointments, and we assume the President knows that
metric. Presidential resources can, therefore, be expressed as the sum of all economic benefits under

1992]

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUEN C E I N DOM ESTIC FISCAL POLICY

1 759

tial policymaking: to the arena in which the President allocates resources
directly to her national constituency, or second, to the congressional setting
in which the President seeks to fashion a support coalition through which to
facilitate her own policy agenda. Each allocation of government program
policies is assumed to enhance her reelection prospects or, if the President is
in her second term, the prospects of her party's chosen successor. 6 8
Of course, allocations to the two spheres of Presidential influence are not
perfect substitutes for each other. While the President is assumed to be able
to claim full credit for all resource dollars given directly by her to voters,
credit for resources allocated to a process of congressional policy reforms
will often have to be shared with congressional members, particularly those
in any presidential reform coalition. 69 At first blush, this would seem to cre
ate a natural bias against the use of presidential resources in the congres
sional arena, especially if the substitution might lead to a less efficient use of
government resources. However, as we will show, those resources can be
leveraged through congressional reform to yield a positive return in constitu
ent benefi t s which exceeds the original presidential allocation.
How can the President build a reform coalition within a universalistic
Congress, and what are the political returns to such a process? Superfi c ially,
building a reform coalition would seem easy, since everyone appears likely to
gain: the President, all members of Congress, and ultimately their constitu
encies. Figure 1 drawn for a typical congressional district illustrates the ar
gument. As argued in Part l.c. 1, the universalistic allocation at level u is an
economically inefficient allocation; that allocation imposes an excess burden
in each congressional district equal, on average, to area [E + F] in Figure 1 .
If the President can only persuade the representative from this typical dis
trict to cut his project requests from level u to the economically efficient level
p, then a potential economic benefit equal to the saved economic inefficien
cies-area [E + F)-will have been created.
The President's problem, however, is that the incentives in the universalis
tic Congress are just the opposite. As indicated in Part l.c. 1, each individual
member of Congress finds it individually rational to demand the allocation of
u for his district, given that all other representatives are also demanding u at
the best level for their own districts. While all members of Congress would
presidential control plus the metric-weighted sum of actions such as political visits and j udicial
appointments.
68. The President's objective need not be just reelection. Policy outcomes, or her place in his
tory, can be objectives too. See Donald Wittman, Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of A lterna
tives, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1 42, 1 43 ( 1 983).
69. The important point here is not the absolute levels of credit claiming for presidential alloca
tions, but rather the relative levels of credit claiming. Typically, the President has to share more of
the credit with members of Congress when seeking fiscal reforms than when she allocates dollars on
her own.
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be better off collectively if spending could be cut from u to p in all districts
collectively gaining the sum of all districts' areas [E + F)-it is irrational for
any member to offer such a spending cut alone. If an individual representa
tive reduced his district's projects allocation from u to p, the constituent ben
efits from those projects-area [C + D + G) in Figure 1 -would be lost.
The district's direct compensation from this reduction would be the district's
share of the tax savings which this reduction in benefits has made possible.
This is approximately equal to (1/N} (m) (u
p}-when ¢ ::::::: (J!N) 7°--or
( l iN) times the area [C + D + E + F + G) , or simply, area [G) in Figure
1 . Since the district's lost benefits of area [C + D + G) are larger than the
district's tax savings of area [G), no district representative can afford to offer
such a reduction on his own. Compensation paid to the district equal to at
least the difference between lost benefits and the resulting tax savings, or area
[C + D), might prove persuasive, however.
It is here that the President's resources come into play in creating a reform
coalition. The President offers to each member of Congress who is willing to
join her reform coalition the needed compensation equal to the net loss in
fiscal benefits of area [C + D) plus a policy "sweetener" with a dollar value
of s . These compensation resources which we shall denote by the dollar
amount w (area [C + D) plus s) are channelled from the President directly to
the constituents of the coalition district-e.g., as a defense contract for the
local shipyard-with both the President and the congressional representative
sharing in the political credit. Having received a district project allocation p
plus presidential compensation equal in value to w, constituents in the dis
trict are now better off economically by the value of the policy sweetener, s.
The district's representative and the President are also better off politically,
since each shares in the credit for bringing the net economic improvement of
s dollars to the district. Note too that residents in districts other than the
reform district also gain; they share in the benefits of smaller tax payments as
expenditures fall from u to p in the reform district. The President in particu
lar can lay political claim to these added economic benefits created by
reform.
Reform coalitions of more than one congressional district increase these
political benefits to the President and the participating representatives. Fig
ure 1 shows the net position of a typical district in the President's reform
coalition when a total of C (C < N) districts join the coalition. If the re-

70. We use "approximately" here since we are estimating each district's share (¢) of tax payments or tax savings by the ratio (IIN). the share that would occur if all districts had approximately
equal average taxpayer incomes. This assumption of equal average incomes is not crucial to the
basic logic of our argument but it does simplify the presentation considerably.
More generally, richer congressional districts will have larger shares of tax payments and tax
sa vings than poorer districts. When trying to understand the final structure of actual presidential
reforms, the distinction between rich and poor districts may become important.
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duced spending in each (typical) district in the coalition yields an average tax
savings per district of area [C + D + E + F + G], then the total tax
savings in which all districts share will be C multiplied by the area [C + D
+ E + F + G] . Each district's share of these total tax savings will be </> ;.:::::;
liN of these savings, or C/N multiplied by the area [C + D + E + F + G] .
This is shown as the area [ C + E] in Figure 1 for the typical congressional
district. When the reform coalition contains C congressional districts, then
each coalition member's district initially loses area [C + D + G] in project
benefits, gains back area [C + D] plus s in presidential compensation, and
then shares in the overall tax savings from reform to the approximate
amount of area [C + E] . The net position is an improvement in constituent
welfare equal to the presidential "sweetener" plus the district's net fiscal sav
ings: s plus area [C + E - G) .7 1 Finally, since the area [C + E - G] of net
tax savings for each member of the reform coalition grows with the size of
the reform coalition, members will wish to add new members to their coali
tion. 7 2 If the President has sufficient resources, it appears, she can fashion a
fiscally efficient coalition of the whole.
Figure 1 also illustrates that members of Congress who do not join the
President's reform coalition-denoted as belonging to the coalition of size
/C-are also better off with reform. Even though their representatives are
not members of the President's coalition, constituents in each district in /C
receive their share of the tax savings from reform, again equal to approxi
mately (1 /N) C multiplied by the area [C + D + E + F + G] . This is again
area [C + E] in Figure 1 . Since members of /C do not participate in the
reform program, their districts do not suffer a decline in district spending
from u to p. Thus, these districts continue to receive area [C + D + G] in
project benefi t s. In contrast to districts in the reform coalition, the President
has no need to compensate these districts nor to offer a sweetener. In the
end, constituents whose members are in the nonreform group receive a net
gain from the President's reform process equal to their share of the reform's
tax savings: area [C + E] . Constituents in nonreform districts are better off
too, a gain for which the President can well claim credit.73
Since everyone gains with the reform process, and larger reform coalitions
71. The area [C + E) is the district's share of total tax savings. Area [G) is what each participat
ing reform district contributes in lost resources to create this tax savings. Note that area [G) is
defined to equal (liN) multiplied by area [C + D + E + F + G) . Thus C multiplied by area [G)
also equals (C/N} multiplied by area [C + D + E + F + G), which is the definition of area [C +
E) , the area of total tax savings.
72. Note that area [C + E) gets larger as the ratio C/N approaches one. Area [G) remains
unchanged, however.
73. At this point, it is important to ask whether the benefits received by residents in the
non reform coalition are larger or smaller than the benefits received by residents in the President's
reform coalition. For if noncoalition districts do better than coalition dist ricts, then no representa-

1 762

THE

GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80: 1 737

are preferred, it would appear the process of reform would push naturally to
a reform coalition "of the whole. " Such a conclusion is premature. We must
expose and then relax two very important assumptions made implicitly in the
argument to date. The first is that the President knows the district marginal
benefit schedules, b(g) ; this information is crucial if presidential compensa
tion and the sweetener are to be paid to coalition members. The second is the
assumption that the President can credibly commit the payment of that com
pensation at the time the fiscal reforms are being voted in Congress-that is,
that she really can "do a deal. " Dropping both assumptions and giving the
President the dual tasks of discovering b(g) and then writing acceptable
compensation contracts will raise the cost of reform, both to the President
and to society as a whole.74
The President has resources within the executive branch to reveal the b(g)
schedules of individual legislators. The staffs of executive agencies specializ
ing in project administration have information about local benefits, while the
Office of Management and Budget has the capacity for independent review of
those estimates. Finally, the President's congressional liaison staff can and
often does extract valuable information about individual districts' benefits
tive has an individual incentive to join the President's team. The congressional thinking becomes:
"Let the other representatives join, but not me; I'll do better for my constituents."
Here is where presidential compensation plus the sweetener matters; payments must be large
enough to ensure that members joining the President's reform coalition C have no incentive to
defect to the nonreform coalition /C. If representatives are primarily concerned about the net fiscal
benefits they bring home to their constituents, then presidential-side payments must be large enough
to leave the constituents in reform districts better off than they would be were their representative to
leave the President's coalition for the nonreform group. Being in a reform district costs residents
gross project benefits of area [C + D + G], but earns them their share of tax savings equal to area
[C + E] . Reform members are also compensated by the President for their lost benefits equal to
area [C + D] and are given a small sweetener, s. After compensation, membership in the reform
coalition earns district residents a net fiscal gain of s plus area [C + E - G] .
What might residents of the district earn if they were to exit the reform coalition for the
nonreform coalition? Being in a nonreform district earns residents a pure economic benefit equal to
their share of tax savings; there are no lost project benefits and, of course, no presidential compensa
tion. Tax savings available to !C members when there is a defection no longer equal area [C + E] ,
however. With a defection of one district from the reform coalition we must subtract that district's
contribution to tax savings; this is area [G] . Thus, the net fiscal gain in /C when you leave C for !C
is area [C + E - G].
Membership in the reform coalition will be preferred to nonreform coalition membership because
net fiscal benefits following reform are greater in C than when defecting to !C. That is, s plus area
[C + E - G] is greater than area [C + E
G] alone.
74. Discovering the marginal benefit schedules of individual members of Congress is necessary if
the process of fiscal reform is to achieve fiscal efficiency. When the marginal benefits of public
projects in each district are unknown to individuals from outside the district-particularly other
congressional representatives-then the district's representative can credibly announce any budget,
including the budget u, as the "efficient" allocation to the district. In the deferential world of
universalistic politics each representative's announced budget is accepted and included in the final
allocation. Unfortunately, what is locally efficient, namely u, is socially inefficient. It is the lack of
public information about each district's b(g) schedule that makes such inefficiencies possible.
-
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during the process of presidential-congressional negotiations. 75 This infor
mation is collected at the cost of executive branch staff and research time, or
by spending dollars in one-on-one negotiations to infer benefits. While these
revelation costs are not likely to be large, 7 6 particularly in comparison to the
gains from controlling fiscal inefficiencies, they will be positive and the Presi
dent must pay them if she is to negotiate credibly with members of Congress
for membership in her reform coalition. We shall denote the resource cost
borne by the President to reveal each district's marginal benefit curve by the
expenditure of r dollars per district for each district in the reform coalition. 77
7 5 . We are not arguing here that this preference revelation role is the only reason the President
creates specialized executive agencies, an Office of Management and Budget, or her liaison staff.
But revelation is a role these agencies can and do play.
76. Detailed benefit-cost analyses of project benefits are done by many executive agencies, either
directly or by contracting work to research and academic centers. Million dollar contracts are not
atypical. Of course, there are significant economies of scale in such research. Once the basic data
and methodologies have been developed for one district, they may transfer to other congressional
districts at little added cost. On the other hand, districts receive their fiscal allocations not as one
common project across all districts, but as many different projects. Some districts receive their
dollars in the form of hundreds of different government expenditures. Thus, to reveal benefits will
require program analysis over many projects. A very rough guess might estimate the cost of re
vealing project benefits in each district as somewhere between $ 50,000 per district (the typical cost
of one professional benefit-cost study) for districts with only one project, to perhaps as much as $2
to $3 million in districts receiving many complicated, and locally unique, government projects each
requiring separate study. If the revelation of project benefits in each district costs, on average,
$200,000 in executive resources, then revelation for a major reform effort might cost close to $ 8 7
million ($200,000 multiplied b y 4 3 5 districts). T h e President certainly h a s these resources. The
Office of Management and Budget has a staff budget of $54 million for fiscal year 1 992, and the ten
domestic policy cabinet positions have research staff budgets ranging from $4.2 million in Transpor
tation to as much as $ 1 60 million in the Corps of Engineers. BuDGET OF THE U NITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FY 1 992, at 278 ( 1 99 1 ).
7 7 . There is the question of why, if the President can spend r dollars to reveal b (g) schedules,
Congress could not do the same. Constitutionally, it certainly can. As a matter of strategic behav
ior, however, there are good reasons to suspect that such a public gathering of private, district
specific information does not occur. First, any information generated about marginal benefits, and
any subsequent development of reform coalitions, provide significant "public" benefits in improved
resource allocations for all members of Congress. Because of such benefit spillovers from this infor
mation, no single member is likely to have the incentive to spend the needed dollars, either from his
own staff budget or by sacrificing his district's project budget. Second, even if all members could
agree to jointly fund the task of gathering information about b(g) schedules, the person or group
who uses that information to fashion a reform budget in effect becomes the budget's agenda setter.
If estimates of district b(g) schedules cannot be easily verified, there is a significant risk in a univer
salistic Congress that those who collect the information can then manipulate i t to their advantage.
Members who do not like the outcome of a proposed reform budget-namely, those who believe
their benefits have been underestimated while the benefits in other districts are overstated-have
only one recourse to check the agenda setter: re-estimate the benefit schedules for themselves.
As a factual matter, there are two organizations now under congressional control which do col
lect and disseminate information about government performance-the General Accounting Office
(GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Despite the potential of GAO and CBO to
provide detailed, district-specific information to curb fiscal inefficiencies, there is no evidence
perhaps for the reasons noted above-that the offices have been used to that end by Congress. See
A LL EN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY 1 49-53, 407 ( 1 980) .
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To fashion a coalition o f size C the President must spend rC dollars.
The President faces another problem in her efforts to develop a reform
coalition: the absence of a binding mechanism for enforcing deals struck
with Congress. Once the b(g) schedule has been revealed for each coalition
member and the promise of compensation and the sweetener (recall w equals
area (C + D] plus s) has been offered, the President must form an agree
ment. Typically, the congressional vote on fiscal reform takes place before w
can be paid to supporting districts. How does the representative know the
President will stand by her word to pay w in economic benefits to the dis
trict?7 8 The best protection is the President's desire to formulate a long-run
working relationship with Congress, so that a violation of a promise damages
the President's reputation and limits her ability to forge working coalitions in
the future. Because there is some uncertainty as to the value the President
places on her future relationships with Congress, legislators will demand a
larger sweetener, denoted here as the premium k, paid as compensation for
agreeing to accept such a risky contract. 79 The value kC measures the con
tracting costs to the President of formulating a reform coalition of size C.
Together, the revelation costs of rC and the contracting costs of kC con
strain the President in her desire to build reform coalitions. In the presence
of these costs, reform coalitions are only attractive if the political benefits that
the President earns following economic reform outweigh the political oppor
tunity costs of spending her scarce presidential resources to build her coali
tion. How does the President balance these political benefits and costs?
Figure 2 illustrates one plausible case in which marginal political benefits to
the President from the reform coalition outweigh the marginal political costs
for small coalitions (C < C ' ) but marginal costs are larger than marginal
benefits for large coalitions (C > C '). In Figure 2, a reform coalition of c ·
members is the President's preferred coalition size.
The marginal political costs to the President of adding one more member
7 8 . The problem of contract enforcement arises in any agreement in which one party performs an
irreversible action in return for compensation at a date after the first action has been completed.
Such situations create incentives for the second party to take the benefits of the action without
paying compensation. The use of reputation to enforce implicit contracts is well studied i n econom
ics. See Bengt Holmstrom, The Provision of Services in a Market Economy, in MANAGING THE
SERVICE ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 1 83 , 1 97-207 (Robert Inman ed., 1 98 5 ) (studying
effects of reputation and contingent contracts in service markets). If there is value to the President
in protecting her reputation, then representatives have some reason to believe the implicit contract
will be respected.
79. Two obvious predictions follow from these observations. First, less trustworthy Presidents
face higher costs in fashioning reform coalitions and will, therefore, be less likely to pursue reform
policies, all else being equal. Second, as Presidents near the end of their second term, or as their
reelection prospects become uncertain, the value to the President of her reputation declines, which
increases the risk of reneging on agreements. This too raises the costs of contracting, leading to a
reduction in the size of reform coalitions.

1 992]

PRES I D ENTIAL INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC FISCAL P O LI C Y
FIGURE

THE

1 765

2

SIZE OF REFORM COALITION

$
Coalition

�p(C)

Benefits
and
Costs

r+w+k

0

C*

N
Number

of Coalition

c

Members

to the reform coalition--denoted in Figure 2 as r + w + k-is simply the
additional money the President must spend from presidential resources to
bring one more district into the coalition. First, r dollars are spent to reveal
a potential coalition member's project benefit schedule. Second, w dollars
(area [C + D] plus s) are paid to induce a coalition member to join, and then
stay within, the reform coalition. Finally, k dollars are needed as the addi
tional premium to coalition members to induce them to accept the uncertain
promise of payment w. The final marginal cost of bringing in one more coali
tion member is therefore the sum, r + w + k, as shown in Figure 2. 80
80. While Figure 2 illustrates this marginal cost as a constant line, this need not be so. Presi
dents are likely to begin fashioning reform coalitions with the "cheapest" members first-for exam
ple, those who have revealed the benefits of their district projects in prior negotiations (thus saving
on r), who have low levels of required compensation (saving on w), and who "trust" the President
(saving on k). Thus, the marginal cost curve is likely to rise as C increases.
Further, coincident ideologies and political parties may lower these presidential costs of reform
particularly r and k-and, therefore, should encourage fiscal reform, a point emphasized in Fitts,
The Vices of Virtue, supra note 1 7, at 1 603- 1 2.
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The marginal political benefits o f adding one more congressional member
to the reform coalition are indicated by the downward sloping political bene
fit curve, p(C) . The marginal political benefits may decline for either, or
both, of two reasons. First, as the President's coalition grows in size, the
ability of the President to claim credit for the economic benefits of reform
may decline. This is particularly so when the reform coalitions get large
(say, one hundred members or so) and reform looks less like the explicit
work of the President and her closest allies, and more like congressional
presidential cooperation. Adding more members to the reform coalition di
lutes the ability of the President to claim that she, and she alone, is responsi
ble for the benefits created by reform.
Second, the p(C) curve measures the relative political attractiveness of us
ing the President's resources for coalition building for fiscal reform or for
direct President-to-constituent allocations. When resources are allocated by
the President from direct constituent servicing to the congressional reform
process, we assume the President first takes resources from her least politi
cally productive direct allocations. In the beginning, therefore, congressional
coalition building looks relatively attractive when compared to the political
gains available from the President's least politically productive direct activi
ties. But as more resources fl o w into coalition building, more and more di
rect allocations are sacrificed, and those sacrificed are increasingly costly.
Thus, even if presidential credit claiming for the benefits of coalition building
remains constant, the marginal political gains from expanding C relative to
direct presidential allocations are likely to decline. 8 1 The net effect is declin
ing political benefits to the President from coalition building for fiscal reform,
either because credit claiming declines as C increases or because the alterna
tive uses of scarce presidential resources become increasingly attractive. 8 2
8 1 . There is a third reason why the marginal benefit curve might decline, but it assumes prior
knowledge on the part of the President of at least some representatives' b(g) schedules. If the
President knows, or guesses successfully, which districts are likely to offer the greatest economic
benefits from fiscal reform, then it is in the President's own interest to include those districts first in
the reform coalition. The very first districts included will be those that offer the highest economic
benefit from reform-namely, those districts that receive the most inefficient projects under univer
salism. Simply put, the President should seek to correct the very worst economic abuses first, if
those abuses can be easily identified.
82. This description of the President's marginal political benefit schedule from coalition building
can also be specified more formally. See I nman & Fitts, supra note 62. There we show that the
President evaluates the marginal political benefits of an additional reform coalition member by the
relationship:

p(C)

=

v(C){dH(C)!dC},

where p(C) is the marginal political benefit curve shown in Figure 2, v(C) is the extra relative value
to the President of an additional claimable dollar from congressional reform, and dH(C)!dC are the
number of additional claimable dollars each new coalition member brings to the President. As
noted in the text, we expect p(C) to decline as C increases for either, or both, of two reasons, now
formally stated: ( 1 ) the relative marginal value of congressional reforms, v(C), falls as the President
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The central conclusions of this analysis, summarized by the results in Fig
ure 2, are twofold. First, Presidents can build reform coalitions to improve
the fiscal allocations of universalistic legislatures if they can bring additional
resources into the legislative arena to overcome the revelation and con
tracting problems which inhibit organizing a decentralized Congress. Sec
ond, as a political matter, Presidents will build such coalitions if their ability
to claim credit for the economic benefits of reform provide sufficient political
returns to justify the investment in coalition building. 8 3 While perhaps not
the fully efficient coalition of the whole which this analysis first seemed to
promise, even modestly sized reform coalitions, such as c · in Figure 2, can
offer improved resource allocations. 84 From a strict efficiency perspective,
each district that enters the reform coalition saves society tax payments of
area [C + D + E + F + G] on average and costs society project benefits of
area [C + D + G] on average; see Figure 1 . The net efficiency gain per
coalition district is therefore area [E + F], the original measure of district
inefficiency with universalism. The economic costs of achieving this effi
ciency gain are the transaction costs paid by the President to establish the
reform coalition (r + k). The net social gain provided by each district in the
builds larger coalitions (dv(C)!dC < 0) or (2) the marginal political gains from larger coalition
building declines (d2H(C)!dC2 < 0).
8 3 . See id. For reasonable specifications of the reform model, if the President can claim that
more than 50% of the benefits of reform was "her doing," then she will find it in her interest to
create at least small coalitions, that is, c· > 1 at a minimum. The intuition is as follows: The
President spends r + w + k in presidential resources on each reform district, and she can claim a
share, 1/J, of the area [C + D + E + F] plus the sweetener s in political benefits created. She will
include any district in a reform coalition if her claim to the gain exceeds her expenditure of re
sources: that is, if 1j; (area [C + D + E + F) + s) > r + w + k. For this condition to hold :

1j;

>

r + w + k!(area [C + D + E + F) + s) .

Note that if demand curves are linear (or approximately so), then area [C + D] approximates area
[E + F] when full reform is achieved. Note, further, that w equals s plus area [C + D]. Thus, for
small values of s, r, and k, this implies that 1j; > . 5 is sufficient for the President to wish to form a
coalition including at least this one district.
84. It should be noted that larger and more economically beneficial reform coalitions are possible
if the President's marginal political benefits from the reform strategy increase or if the President's
marginal costs of coalition formation decline. This is clear from Figure 2, where C' rises with an
outward shift in the marginal benefit curve, p(C), or a downward shift in the cost curve, r + w + k .
The marginal benefit schedule will shift outward when congressional reforms yield more political
benefits to the President than direct allocations (i.e., v(C) rises) as, for example, when the President
has more resources to allocate to coalition building or when running "against Congress" is a win
ning Presidential strategy. The p(C) curve will also shift outward when coalition building becomes
more productive (i.e., dH(C)!dC rises) as, for example, when presidential credit claiming rises by
isolating nonreform members as "noncooperating budget-busters." The marginal cost curve will
slide downward as revelation becomes easier (r falls, for example, when congressional projects be
come less idiosyncratic across districts), as required presidential compensation declines (w falls
when less districts actually benefit from government projects), and as presidential promises become
more credible (k falls as the President becomes more conscious of her reputation, for example, early
in her tenure).
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President's reform coalition i s therefore area [E + F] less (r + k ) . 85 If the
transactions costs of the reform process are not "too high," then the aggre
gate economic gains exceed the transactions costs of coalition building and
the presidential reform process will make a net contribution to aggregate eco
nomic welfare.
Fiscal equity too may be improved, but this outcome depends upon the
distributional preferences of the President and exactly who she chooses for
her reform coalition. First, if the dollar savings come disproportionately
from programs benefiting richer districts-for example, when loopholes are
eliminated from the tax code-and returned on a per capita basis, then the
ultimate result of fiscal reform is likely to be progressive. However, if the
dollar savings are taken and returned uniformly against income, then the
outcome will be fiscally neutral. Third, and finally, if the President and her
reform coalition target the distribution of tax savings disproportionally to the
wealthy-as for example when tax savings are returned as proportional rate
reduction off a progressive tax system-the ultimate incidence of fiscal re
form may be regressive against income. 86 E ven in the regressive case, how
ever, we must note that "poorer districts" are not economically worse off in
an absolute sense, for to join the President's reform coalition they must have
been compensated for any economic losses they might have borne from fiscal
reform.
On balance, therefore, presidential coalition building holds the promise of
8 5 . While the President also pays the amount w (area [C + D) plus s) in compensation to mem
bers of the reform coalition, this payment is simply a transfer from the Presidential account to the
congressional account; no new economic value is created.
More formally, for each district that enters the reform coalition, the national citizenry receives a
net gain from reform, payable into a "congressional account," equal to:

Tax Savings + Compensation/Sweetener - Lost Project Benefits
or
area (C + D + E + F + G) + area [C + D) + s - area (C + D + G).
To earn this net gain per reform district, citizens must pay, from their "Presidential account," an
amount per reform district equal to:
Compensation/Sweetener + Revelation Costs + Contracting Costs
or
area [C + D) + s + r + k.
Subtracting the net gain per reform district from the net costs per reform district, gives the eco
nomic surplus for the national citizenry contributed by each district in the reform coalition:
area [E + F)
(r + k).
It is difficult to gauge the likelihood of these three cases, but it is possible that presidential
politics may be more distributionally progressive than congressional politics in the long-run: "Pres
idents from Eisenhower to Reagan have tended to introduce more proposals under the general
rubric of redistribution than any other single policy type." PETERSON, supra note 5 5 , at 1 77. Of
course, even if the institution of the Presidency has a progressive bias, obviously i ndividual presi
dents may diverge. For an argument that the long-run is the appropriate horizon for design of
institutions--our task here-see Fitts, supra note 9 .
-

86.
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improved fiscal performance, assuming the existence of sufficient informal
executive resources. This potential for welfare improving fiscal reforms is
enhanced still further when we allow for the interaction of coalition building
with the strategic use of the President's one formal, constitutional power, the
veto.
B . COALITION B U I LD I N G AND THE VETO: FORCING LARGE R EFORMS

Although positive political theory's analysis of the presidential veto often
finds the impact of the veto to be quite weak, 87 the veto, when used in con
junction with the process of informal coalition building described above, in
fact can be quite important. As we argue below, the President can, through
coalition building and the strategic use of a commitment to veto, force all of
the individual members of Congress to face the full marginal costs and bene
fits of their universalistic behavior. Knowing how and when to use this joint
strategy of coalition building plus the veto raises the prospects for significant
fiscal reforms and major political payoffs. 8 8
Let us assume the President uses the informal resources of her office to
construct the modestly sized coalition described above, C ( C < N total
legislators), in which all members of the coalition embrace fiscal reform. Co
alition members willingly support the President's proposal to cut project
spending in their districts from the inefficient level u to the efficient level p.
Representatives not in the reform coalition, however, are not so moved.
They continue to ask for, and to receive from the still decentralized Con
gress, their inefficient project levels, u . Without paying the costs of revela
tion (r), compensation (w), and contracting (k), neither the President nor the
c · members of her reform coalition can induce these nonreform members of
Congress to join their team. In this case, the reform budget therefore con
sists of C • districts receiving their efficient levels p and the remaining districts
in the ;c · nonreform coalition (N
C * ) receiving their universalistic pro
ject levels, u . We shall call this budget the "modest reform budget" and
represent it by the notation B(p0 u 1c), noting that P c is a vector of efficient
project allocations for each of the members of the c · reform coalition and
that U ;c• is a vector of universalistic project allocations for each of the mem
•
bers of the /Cs nonreform coalition. The budget B(pc, u 1c) is the outcome of
the presidential coalition process of Part I L A above. The question now is
whether the President can improve upon this allocation by using her formal
•

•

-

8 7 . See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
8 8 . A full discussion o f the veto strategy i s presented
present o n l y the simplest, but most effective, strategy here.

in I nman & F i t t s , supra n o te 62.

We

I n the full discussion we s h o w t h at t h e

veto s t rategy w i l l be l i m i ted by the abi l i ty of t h e President t o c o m m i t t o i t s u s e . W i t h m o r e l i m i ted
commitment, compromise reforms lying between universalism and ful l efficiency-t he outcome we
predict i n the text-are the more l ikely outcomes.
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veto powers. Can she force a fully efficient budget of B(pN), where PN is a
vector of efficient district projects for N districts? 8 9
Two extreme cases lead to fairly predictable results. If the President has
*
built a coalition that constitutes a majority of Congress (C > . 5N) then
B(pN) will be approved since the President and the members of her coalition
·
C all prefer B(pN) . While our model certainly allows for this possibility, as a
factual matter we doubt that the President alone has the resources to reveal
and credibly compensate a full majority coalition.90 In a second case where
·
'
c is less than one-third of the legislature (C < . 33N), then the outcome
·
must be the modest reform budget. The majority members of the ;c coali
tion have the incentive and the votes to defeat any budget other than
B(pc, u1c) . 9 1 Further, even threatening a veto strategy is useless, for the Pres
ident does not have enough votes in her coalition to sustain any veto she
·
might offer. Thus, when c < . 33N, B(pc, u1c) is the only outcome.
The most interesting case, however, is when the President's coalition is
large enough to sustain a veto, but not large enough to pass a major reform
·
budget on its own-that is, when . 33N < c < . 5N. Can the President now
·
leverage her c votes with a veto threat to pass B(pN) ? Clearly, the formal
veto alone is not enough, for by itself her threat to veto is not credible.
Though she might originally propose a major reform B(pN) and have the
·
·
support of her c coalition, members of the majority ;c coalition will play
their individually rational, universalistic strategies and pass the modest re89. To improve upon the modest reform budgets, B(pc. u1d. which coalition building allows, the
President must induce the noncoalition members of Congress to accept a reduction in their districts'
budgets from u to (ideally) p. Suppose she were to propose a more extensive reform budget B(p,,) .
The major reform budget is economically more efficient than the modest reform budget, so the
President will prefer B(p.v) to B(pc. u1d if she can claim credit for at least a portion of these addi
tional economic benefits. We assume she can. Members of the President's reform coalition also
prefer B(pN) to B(pc. u1d since the extensive reform budget will give their constituents increased tax
savings with no additional loss in project benefits. We assume they all vote for the major reform.
The members of the nonreform coalition, however, face the very same dilemma they faced as
members of the fully universalistic Congress. While the President has proposed the major reform
budget and announced it to be the efficient budget, individual members of the Congress cannot
verify this claim. They do not know the true marginal benefit schedules b(g) of their fellow mem
bers, and each u nless compensated by the President reta i ns the private incentive to dispute the
President's estimates of their efficient p. Each representative of !C claims the P resident has under
estimated his district's true benefits: " If the President had only estimated b{g) correctly, our 'effi
cient' budget would have been projects of size u . " All members of !C prefer the efficient spending
for all districts save one, their own. Since the members of !C lack the ability (i.e., resources) to
discipline each other's behavior to ensure collective support for the President's efficient budget, they
adopt their old universalistic strategies to ensure they are not separately exploited. The President's
major reform budget B(p ,) therefore unravels with floor amendments to become the modest reform
proposal of B(p0 u1d. Thus, for the President to simply announce a reform proposal is not enough.
She must do more.
90. A strong and well-financed political party might have the needed resources, however. See
Fitts, The Vices of Virtue, supra note 1 7, at 1 603-09.
9 1 . Holmstrom, supra note 78, at 1 83 .
-

-
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form budget B(pc, u1c) . If the President threatens and then vetoes this budget
and her coalition sustains her veto, then all players receive the initial status
quo budget which is the universalism budget, B(uN), where uN is a vector of
all districts' allocations at their levels u . Both the President and her reform
coalition prefer the modest reform budget B(pc, u1c) to B(uN) · Members of
'
!C know, therefore, that if they pass B(pc, u1c) the President and her coali
tion will accept it. Thus, the President's naked threat to veto B(pc, u 1c) to
receive B(uN) is not credible.
To influence policy beyond modest reform, therefore, the President needs
to create a credible veto threat, namely, to establish that the modest reform
budget of B(pc, u1c) is, from her own point of view, worse than accepting the
universalistic status quo budget, B(uN) . 92 Two possibilities exist for bringing
such new and informal costs into the policy game. First, the President may
make a public precommitment to major reform of the budget sufficient to
make any deviation from that reform politically unacceptable. By vetoing
less than full reform, the President can establish the desirable reputation with
the public that she is a candidate of principle and thereby avoid later political
charges that she is not person of her word, dishonest, or worse still, a
"wimp." Second, beyond any public "political" costs, the President may
make it clear to members of Congress that her word and promise to veto will
be more important to future interactions with political leaders, including
Congress, than any credit claiming lost by the veto of a modest reform
budget. In each instance, the President puts her reputation, and thus her
future political prospects, on the line.93
In addition to a reputational impact, this strategy also relies on the fact
that the line must be clearly drawn and the offer to Congress simply made:
all (B(pN) ) or nothing (B(uN) )· If the unacceptable budget that will activate
the veto is at all fuzzy, allowing some districts to pursue universalism if most
other districts are efficient, then members of the nonreform coalition still
'
have an incentive to act universalistically. Each member of /C hopes to be
one of the lucky districts the President will permit to be inefficient. Fuzzy
veto threats, therefore, encourage only partial fiscal reforms, placing the
President in the awkward position of appearing to back down if she accepts
the partial package. Clearly drawn budget choices presented as all-or-noth
ing offers will avoid this problem .94 The President must make clear that any
92. Our model builds upon the important insights of D. I ngberman & D . Yao, Presidential Com
mitment and the Veto, 3 5 AM. J. PoL SCI. 357 ( 1 99 1 ) .
9 3 . If s h e does not veto when she said she would, she bears potentially large costs in t h e form of
the economic value of her lost reputation. These losses, if the veto commitment is violated, can be
described formally. See id. ; Inman & Fitts, supra note 62.
94. For a general discussion of "clear" and "fuzzy" veto sets, see Ingberman & Yao, supra note
92.
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deviation from the full reform budget of B(pN) will force a sustainable veto
and give the universalistic budget B(uN) .
I f a credible commitment to veto can b e made, members of the nonreform
coalition now face a clear choice: major reform or the universalistic status
quo. Importantly, it is now individually rational to support the reform budget,
even if one belongs to the nonreform coalition. If any one member of ;c ·
deviates from B(pN) and proposes a u amendment for his own district, that
will be sufficient to trigger the President's veto if the offending amendment is
approved. A veto gives the budget B(uN) . 95 All members of Congress prefer
the efficient reform budget B(pN) to the universalistic status quo B (u N) . Since
under the veto threat any single u amendment will move the budget from
B(pN) to B(u.rv) , no member will propose u . 96 Further, all other members of
/C have an individual incentive to vote down any such deviations. When
Congress faces this all or nothing choice, the major reform budget passes
unanimously!97
Thus, a President is not without influence over the budgetary affairs of an
inefficient and decentralized Congress, even when all members of Congress
initially vote for such unattractive budgets. Through the strategic use of her
informal resources and formal veto powers, the President can fashion a legis
lative strategy of coalition building and position taking that draws all mem
bers of Congress into supporting an efficient fiscal outcome. Importantly, a
decentralized Congress could not achieve this reform outcome on its own. A
presidential veto strategy and presidential resources are required. Note too
that neither informal resources (provided c · < . 5N) nor formal veto powers
alone could be used to achieve this major reform outcome. Presidentially
initiated major reforms are possible, but typically only when the President
uses her informal and formal resources jointly.
•

95. It is important to ask at this point whether the members of the President's veto coalition C"
will sustain her veto of a partial reform. The answer is yes, if the presidential sweetener s paid to
members of c· is large enough to compensate them for taking the universalistic outcome rather than
the partial reform.
96. I n an important sense, the President's use of the commitment to veto solves the collective
action problem of Congress. When a credible commitment to veto can be made, and the President
presents the Congress with an aU-or-nothing choice of reform or universalism, each individual
member of Congress now faces the full social costs of any decision to increase spending from the
President's proposed budget of p to an inefficient budget u . When full social costs have been inter
nalized, efficient choices are the likely outcome. This is the case here.
97. I n the simple case outlined here, even when the costs of violating the commitment are q uite
modest, the veto strategy is still effective. See I nman & Fitts, supra note 62. However, in more
realistic settings in which legislatures can form their own partial reform plans to compete with the
President's full reform, the President's costs of violating her commitment to veto must be larger.
Nevertheless, the President's ability to make a commitment to impose large costs may not be cred i
ble. The veto strategy is, therefore, constrained by the maximum credible penalty the President can
impose upon herself. When constrained, less than fully efficient fiscal reforms will be the compro
mise outcome of the veto game.
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While this analysis may be compelling i n the abstract, some may minimize
the likelihood that this effort will be undertaken very often in real life. The
number of legislators who must be won over may be large, the available exec
utive resources may be minimal, and the likelihood of success accordingly
small. To some degree this may explain why this is not an everyday presi
dential strategy. But the potential is there. Certain executives, especially
some governors and mayors, as well as Presidents in some contexts, have a
great deal of discretionary resources to bring to the legislative arena. In ad
dition, Presidents can build upon preexisting ideological support in Congress
for their efforts to create a coalition close to or above the required veto level
for major reform. Only limited additional economic resources will then be
needed to create a fully effective veto coalition. And once a veto coalition is
established, the potential economic and political benefits can rise quite sub
stantially, making the political payoff from the reform strategy for the execu
tive quite large indeed.
Part III applies this analysis to two illustrative examples of presidential
efforts at fi s cal reform. One worked-Reagan and the Tax Reform Act of
1 98 6-and one did not-Carter and his tax reform failure of 1 97 8 . We
think our model helps us to understand why.
III.

TAX REFO R M D U RING THE CARTER AND REAGAN P R ES IDENCIES
A. THE POLICY ISSUES U NDERLYING TAX REFORM

The formation of national tax policy involves two decisions: a choice of tax
base and a choice of tax rate progressivity to be applied against that base.
The latter, rate progressivity, is inevitably a zero-sum political game; there
are winners and there are losers. A survey of the national tax codes of most
industrial democracies reveals the typical winner in this "us versus them"
redistribution game is the dominant majority from the lower tail of the initial
pretax, or common law, distribution of income. 98 The resulting structure of
relative tax rates in most western democratic societies is progressive-that is,
average tax rates rise with taxable incomes.
Also to be decided by democratic politics is the tax base against which
these tax rates are to be applied. Income, both for individuals and corpora9 8 . See James Snyder & Gerald Kramer, Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive
Income Tax, 36 J. PuB. EcoN. 1 97 , 1 98 tbl . 1 ( 1 988). Of course policy cycling is possible in such
voting games, as groups of rich taxpayers can try to break off splinter groups of poorer households
to form new majorities to defeat the original decisive coalition. Empirically, however, such cycles
over rate structures rarely occur.
There are numerous theoretical studies that derive stable structures of relative tax rates from a
majority rule process. For a survey of the major theories now offered, see Inman, supra note 22, at
727-38. Which of these different approaches in fact explains the source of the observed stability of
relative rate st ructures is still an open question.

1 774

THE GEORGETOWN L A W JOURNAL

[Vol. 80: 1 73 7

tions, is the typical choice, but exactly what constitutes taxable income is an
economically subtle and, at times, politically explosive issue.99 Clearly,
whatever the structure of tax rates, it is in the economic interest of each
taxpayer to favor a definition of taxable income that reduces his or her tax
payments. Since taxable income equals pretax income minus tax exemptions
and deductions, taxpayers generally want to maximize their exemptions and
deductions. The democratic struggle over the definition of tax base ulti
mately reduces to a democratic struggle over the inclusion in the tax code of
everyone's favorite exemptions and deductions.
How does Congress decide the tax base issue? Detailed case studies of tax
policy in today's Congress often reveal a process of universalism in which
each representative logrolls for the approval of his constituents' own favorite
exemption or deduction in return for the nodding approval of everyone else's
preferred tax break. 100 In this setting, while the distribution of benefits may
not be as district specific as the allocation of army bases or water projects can
be, the political economy model of decentralized budgeting presented in Fig
ure 1 is still a reasonable description of Congressional choice over many ex
emptions and deductions. "Project size" in Figure 1 is now the amount of
income taxes saved by district residents through a favorable tax deduction or
exemption. The benefit curve b(g) measures the marginal benefits to district
residents from these tax breaks. 1 0 1 Such deductions and exemptions from the
income tax base are known popularly as "tax expenditures . " 1 02 Like govern
ment spending, these tax favors must be paid for through increases in tax
rates or government deficits. The cost curves m and cpm measure, respec
tively, the full marginal cost and district's share of the marginal costs of pro-

I
l

99. See generally JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1 987) (providing a use
ful summary of the major economic issues i n tax policy). Any number of examples from Pechman
illustrate the political divisions over the definition of income. When taxing personal income:
Should social security benefits be classified as taxable income? Unemployment compensations?
Welfare benefits? Company provided insurance benefits? Should charitable contribution be
counted as reductions in personal income or are such payments consumption and, therefore.
counted as income? When taxing corporate income: How should sapital be depreciated as a busi
ness expense? Are "sky-boxes" business expenses? Are dividend payments a cost of capital? Each
of these questions has engendered a political fight in recent years.
100. For the definitive review of the process of tax policy in contemporary Congress, see JOHN F.
W ITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL I NCOME TAX 2 7 1 - 3 3 8 ( 1 9 8 5). See
a/so RANDALL STRAHAN, NEW WAYS AND MEANS: REFORM AND CHANGE I N A CONGRES
SIONAL COMMITTEE 1 22-23 ( 1 990).
1 0 1 . While tax favors transfer income to residents, they do so not as lump-sum grants, but as
price subsidies. Dollars transferred by price subsidies will have declining marginal value relative to
the marginal value of a pure income transfer. Thus, a downward sloping b(g) c u rve as drawn in
Figure I is appropriate for district tax favors given as price subsidies.
l 02. The term was first used by Stanley Surrey i n his famous critique of the U.S. tax code. See
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITUR ES
( 1 973). Congress now requires the measurement of tax expenditures as a supplement to the annual
federal budget.
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viding local tax favors. As Figure 1 makes clear, the same universalistic
congressional incentives that can lead to too much project spending may also
lead to excessive (i.e., level u) tax favors. 103 Further, as with excessive gov
ernment spending, the resulting tax breaks may be criticized as both econom
ically inefficient and economically inequitable. 104
The size and growing importance of federal government tax expenditures
are documented in Table 1 . The level of these expenditures are approxi
mately equal to the levels of federal government spending for domestic
projects, for the military budget, and for social insurance programs over the
recent decade, each totalling about 2 1 % of total government outlays. 1 05
From 1 974 (the first year full data was available) to its peak in 1 98 5 , real tax
expenditures grew at an annual rate of 5 . 5 % per year. For the same period,
real federal project spending grew by less than 1 % per year, military spend
ing grew by 3 . 3 % , social insurance outlays by 4 . 7 % , and real interest pay
ments by 7 . 2 % . Finally, when we compare this 5 . 5 % rate of growth of tax
expenditures to the same period's modest 1 . 3 % growth in real income per
103. Strahan and Witte provide case study evidence that universalism is the norm behind current
congressional tax policy. See STRAHAN, supra note 1 00, at 1 22-23; W ITTE, supra note 1 00, at 2 7 1 3 3 8 . Inman and Fitts use the model o f Figure 1 t o formally test-and find support for-the effects
of universalistic congressional institutions on U .S. tax policy. See generally Inman & Fitts, supra
note 2.
1 04. For the personal income tax, economic inefficiencies have been documented for municipal
bond tax exemptions, OFFICE OF STATE AND LOCAL FIN., DEP'T OF TREASURY, FEDERAL STATE
LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 3 1 7- 1 8 ( 1 98 5) ; state and
local tax deductions, Theodore Bergstrom, et al., A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Public Edu
cation, 35 J. Pus. EcoN. 289, 295 ( 1 988); housing mortgage deductions, Harvey Rosen, Housing
Subsidies, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 394, 402-03 (Alan Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds. , 1 98 5); and the exemption of health care insurance premiums, Martin Feldstein & Bernard
Friedman, Tax Subsidies, the Rational Demand for Insurance, and the Health Care Crisis, 7 J. Pus.
EcoN. 1 55 , 1 68· 72 ( 1 977). Often cited examples of tax code induced economic inefficiencies for the
corporate income tax include oil and gas depletion allowances, differential depreciation, investment
tax credits, and the tax itself. See ALAN AUERBACH, CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 468-69 (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 98 3) .
Tax equity also has been harmed b y t h e growth i n t a x expenditures. First, the dollar value of
exemptions and deductions increases as pretax income rises, thereby reducing tax progressivity.
This occurs for two reasons: ( 1 ) upper income households often qualify for larger deductions (state
and local taxes, home mortgage) and use certain exemptions more frequently (IRAs, capital gains);
and (2) because richer families face higher marginal tax rates, even equal deductions and exemp
tions translate into larger dollar tax savings for the rich. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATIS
TICS OF INCOME: INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS (note particularly those tables listing returns with
itemized deductions and exemptions by taxpayers' adjusted gross incomes). Both effects reduce the
overall progressivity of the federal income tax. See JoSEPH A. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES,
1 965-85 8 ( 1 98 5). For evidence that removing these tax expenditures can improve tax equity, see
Jane G. Gravelle, Equity in Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1 986, 6 J. EcoN. PERSP. 27 ( 1 992).
Second, families earning the same pretax incomes often qualify for different levels of exemptions
and deductions. If so, families with identical incomes may face different tax payments. This is a
violation of the economic principle of horizontal equity, another measure of tax fairness.
1 05 . See Inman & Fitts, supra note 2, at 79-78 tbl. I . Government interest payments constituted
the remaining 1 6% of total government outlays.
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capita, we see that tax expenditures now consume a larger share of national
income, rising from 5 . 5 % of income in 1 974 to 8 . 5 % of income by 1 9 8 5 . As
inefficient and inequitable as they may be, tax expenditures have increasingly
become an important component of our domestic fiscal policy.
i1
!

TABLE 1
TOTAL TAX R EVENUES LOST FROM FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 1 06

( 1 982
YEAR

DOLLARS)
Total

1 974

7 1 4.94

1 97 5

709.44

1 97 6

695.86

1 977

747.43

1 97 8

8 3 5 . 80

1 9 79

902. 82

1 9 80

874. 5 2

1 98 1

977.94

1 9 82

1 1 04.00

1 98 3

1 074. 1 8

1 9 84

1 23 2 . 3 6

1 985

1 290. 54

1 98 6

1 1 69 . 74

1 98 7

1 008 . 47

1 988

920.42

1 9 89

893.73

I
l

l

l

l1

Yet something happened to this upward trend in 1 986. From the peak in
1 9 8 5 to the most recent available estimates for 1 9 89, real tax expenditures
per capita declined by over 30% . The cause of this dramatic turnaround was
the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1 986. The Act's unmistakable target
wz..s growing tax expenditures. It is also worth noting that the ultimate inci
dence of the Tax Reform Act-that is, combining the effects on distribution
of rate reductions and loophole closings-was to make our tax code more
progressive. Understanding why major tax reform occurred in 1 9 86 and not
sooner-notably, why Reagan succeeded and Carter did not-is our task
below.
1 06. Sources: Tax Expenditures, Statistical Abstract of the United States, "Revenue Losses:
Tax Expenditures due to Federal Tax Law"; Population, Statistical Abstract of the United States;
GNP Deflator, Statistical Abstract of the United States and The Economic Report of the President,
1 99 1 .
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It was not for a lack of enthusiasm for major tax reform that President
Jimmy Carter failed to move us toward a more efficient and equitable tax
system during his Presidency. Indeed, his election success was based in no
small measure on his commitment to the issue of tax reform and controlling
tax expenditures. 108 A repeated Carter campaign theme was to label the ex
isting tax system a "disgrace to the human race. " 109
The Carter administration proposed a comprehensive tax reform package
in January 1 97 8 , one year after assuming the presidency. The principles of
the reform were clear: simplify the tax code to improve economic efficiency
and to insure a more equitable treatment of taxpayers, and use some of the
savings to stimulate economic growth. 1 10 The income tax base was to be
broadened and tax expenditures controlled, on the personal side, through a
general tightening of tax deductions (notably, for medical and casualty
losses, charity, and state and local taxes) and tax exclusions (for unemploy
ment benefits received by those earning more than $20,000, for capital gains
received by upper income households, and for municipal bond interest pay
ments). On the corporate side there was to be an elimination of tax deferrals
(for foreign corporate income), and a phased elimination in the tax exempt
status for export sales (via Domestic International Sales Corporations or
DISCs). The administration estimated that its reform package would reduce
tax expenditures by $9.5 billion in fiscal year 1 979, or about $50 per capita
when measured in 1 982 dollars. 1 1 1 The Carter reform package would then
return these tax savings through a uniform two percent cut in all personal tax
rates and a four percent cut in the corporate tax rate. Further, the personal
exemption, which favors families in higher income tax brackets, would be
replaced by a neutral $240 tax credit for every taxpayer. Tax progressivity
would be improved thereby. Finally, in an effort to stimulate economic
growth, Carter proposed permanent status for an expanded ten percent in
vestment tax credit. Together, the reductions in tax rates and the personal
and investment tax credits would cost the Treasury $22. 5 billion in fiscal year
107. Two excellent summaries of the political history of this bill are found in WITTE, supra note
1 00, at 204- 1 7; Edward R. Kantowicz, The Limits of Incrementalism: Carter's Efforts at Tax
R eform, 4 J. PoL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 2 1 7 ( 1 9 85).
1 08. Political analysts commenting on the Ford-Carter campaign pointed to tax reform as one of
the major differences between the candidates. See Kantowicz, supra note 107, at 2 2 1 . In his accept
ance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Carter promised: "It's time for a complete
overhaul of our income tax system . . . . All my life I 've heard promises about tax reform, but it
never quite happened. With your help we are finally going to make it happen. " Id. at 2 2 1 .
1 09. Id.
1 1 0. Id. at 227.
I l l . See WITTE, supra note 1 00, at 206. The estimated $9.5 billion savings is divided by the 1 979
value of the gross national product price deflator ( . 7 8 8) denominated in 1 982 dollars, and the 1 979
population (.225 billion) to estimate real per capita savings.

1 77 8

T H E GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80: 1 7 37

1 979. 1 1 2
Congress was unimpressed. By April 1 978, the House Ways and Means
Committee not only defeated the administration's major reforms to close de
ductions, it expanded the charitable deduction provision to taxpayers who do
not itemize! 1 1 3 Though this proposal was finally dropped, the intent of Con
gress with respect to tax expenditures was clear. The final bill closed no
existing tax favors. It did, however, increase the personal exemption, lower
rates for the middle class, expand I RA exemptions, double the credit for
political contributions, extend municipal bond tax exempt status to water
and electrical generation facilities, allow deductions for firm contributions to
employee educational expenses, and, finally, reduce the maximum tax rates
for capital gains for individuals and corporations. 1 14 In the end, Carter's
lone achievement was in stopping Senate efforts to bring tax expenditures to
the financing of private education via a tuition tax credit. 1 1 5 The House (362
to 49) and the Senate (86 to 4) approved the new bill, known as the Revenue
Act of 1 978, 1 1 6 nearly unanimously . 1 1 7 As John Witte remarks at the end of
his review of the legislative history: "Never in the history of the income tax
were [administration] proposals so out of step with congressional intentions,
and never were they so completely defeated. " 1 1 8
Three factors incorporated into our model appear to have undercut Presi
dent Carter's efforts to achieve major tax reform. First, Carter's presidential
resources available for coalition building may have been in relatively short
supply. Congress was only just emerging from under the domination of the
Nixon Presidency and beginning to reassert itself in matters of fiscal pol
icy. 1 1 9 Further, Carter's ability and willingness to trade nonfiscal policies
for fiscal reform may have been more limited; there were fewer clear major
social issues (e.g., civil rights, right to life) on the national agenda during this
period with which the President could or would promise to attract support
ers for fiscal policy.
Second, the potential costs to Carter of coalition formation within Con
gress appeared to be high, particularly by his second year. Carter in fact paid
the revelation costs (r) necessary for reform; the U.S. Treasury staff under
1 1 2. Jd.
1 1 3. !d. at 207.
1 1 4. !d. at 208- 1 3 .
1 1 5. See id. a t 2 1 5 . The failure o f this provision t o b e included i n the bill may have had less t o do
with Carter's proposed veto than with a threatened constitutional challenge by public school inter
est groups.
1 1 6. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 ( 1 978).
1 1 7. WITTE, supra note 1 00, at 209, 2 1 2.
1 1 8. !d. at 207.
1 1 9. See R U DOLPH G. PENNER & ALAN J. A BRAMSON, BROKEN PURSE STRINGS: CONGRES
SIONAL B U DGETING, 1 974-88 ( 1 988).
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the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary Emil Sunley devoted their first
year in office to fashioning a politically feasible reform proposal 1 20-in effect,
revealing the b (g) schedules of Figure 1 . Potential compensation payments
needed to draw members into a supporting coalition (w) may also have been
higher; real median family incomes had been stagnant for four years, perhaps
placing a higher premium on constituent tax favors. 1 2 1 More important than
either r or w , however, was the implicitly high cost of "contracting" (k) faced
by the Carter administration in early 1 978. Following a presidential embar
rassment over tax policy in 1 977, Congress, and in particular the chair (Al
Ullman) and members of the House Ways and Means Committee, no longer
trusted Carter to stand by his word on tax policy. 122 Carter promises were
no longer credible to the members, and serious coalition formation for tax
reform therefore became almost impossible. 1 2 3 The only tool that remained
to force major tax reform was the formal veto.
Third, Carter mismanaged the veto strategy too. 1 2 4 Carter's reform was
never presented to Congress as a clearly specified, ali-or-nothing alternative
to the status quo. The reform proposal itself was an ambivalent attack on the
concept of tax expenditures. While it proposed to close many tax favors, it
also proposed several new favors, notably new investment credits for busi
ness. 1 25 When discussions on reform began, Carter never drew the line
clearly between what was acceptable and what was not. His veto threat,
when it was finally offered, was only a "fuzzy veto threat" in support of
1 20. Kantowicz, supra note 1 07, at 224-25.
1 2 1 . During the discussion of tax reform, there was much mention in Congress of a need for
additional tax relief for middle class taxpayers suggesting, perhaps, an upward shift of the b(g)
schedules for representatives from these districts. See Witte, supra note 100, at 207. This would
increase required compensation (w) for j oining a presidential coalition. I n support, I nman and Fitts
find some historical evidence that domestic project spending and tax favors increase during periods
of high unemployment. Inman & Fitts, supra note 2, at 1 08-09 tbl. IV, 1 1 8- 1 9 tbl. V. Congres
sional proposals to offer tax relief during the current recession offer another example of this ten
dency. See Robin Toner, To the Presiden tial Hopefuls, the Middle Class is Royalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1 1 , 1 992, at A l .
1 22. Upon entering the presidency i n 1 977, Carter had sought a tax cut package aimed at stimu
lating the economy. Its centerpiece was an egalitarian $ 50 rebate for all taxpayers. The bill moved
easily through the House only to be bogged down in the Senate. What finally emerged was a
strongly probusiness bill with a job credit for hiring new workers. The egalitarian tax rebate had
been dropped. Liberals in the House felt betrayed when Carter signed the bill without even a fight
for the rebate. "Ullman and other Democratic leaders felt they had gone out on a limb for the tax
rebate and the President had sawed it off." Kantowicz, supra note 1 07, at 223 .
1 23. Even his most natural allies, House liberal Democrats, had abandoned Carter's efforts at tax
reform. Just as the Washington Post predicted: "Without the support from liberals, Carter has
virtually no chance of getting a comprehensive tax bill through Congress. " Art Pine, House Liber
als Urge Carter to Cut Back on Tax Package, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1 8, 1 977, at 08.
1 24. Of course, even a well-managed veto strategy could not overcome the more fundamental
problem that Carter's support coalition for reform was minimal at best. Nonetheless, Carter's expe
rience is informative of what is needed to make the veto work for fiscal reform.
1 2 5. WITTE, supra note 100, at 204-06.
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major reform, aimed only at specific provisions (i.e., the school tmt10n tax
credit) of the emerging tax bill . 1 2 6 Members easily worked around the veto
threat to produce a bill which significantly expanded the level of tax favors.
When the Congress had finished its tax work, Democratic representative
Fortney Stark offered the following assessment of Carter's efforts at fiscal
reform:
The rich will have Christmas with ill-gotten gains.
While others pay taxes with annual pains.
But Scrooging the people is Washington's credo,
Now what we need, Tiny Jim, is a veto!! P 27

It did not happen. With congressional elections just three weeks away,
Carter felt he could not reject a tax cut fashioned by a Democratic Con
gress. 1 2 8 Universalism had won. 1 29
C. R EAGAN S U CCEEDS : T H E TAX REFORM ACT OF

1 98 6 1 30

The similarities and the contrasts of the Carter and Reagan P residencies
on tax reform could not be more striking. Like Carter, Ronald Reagan be
came a strong proponent of major tax reform. In their campaigns for the
Presidency, both men advocated the need to shrink special interest tax favors
and to use the resulting tax savings to lower tax rates for all taxpayers. Like
Carter before him, Reagan made tax reform the centerpiece of his 1 9 84 re
election campaign. 13 1
On May 28, 1 9 85, five months into his second term, Reagan introduced his
tax proposals in a nationally televised address. Although Carter and Reagan
may have differed in their views of tax progressivity, both were clearly com
mitted to closing tax loopholes; in fact, Reagan went for more. The reform
proposal-called Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
1 26. !d. at 2 1 4- 1 5 .
1 27. Kantowicz, supra note 1 07, at 228.
128. !d. at 229.
1 29. Michael Graetz summarizes well the congressional process and the impediments to signifi
cant tax reform. He blames the congressional reforms which decentralized the committee system
and opened the door to universalism: [P]rospects for structural tax reform have been dimmed by
recent 'reforms' in congressional practices . . . . [P]olitical leadership on tax matters has become
increasingly diffuse . . . . [F]or those who would urge massive tax reforms, there is now more than
ample cause for despair. Michael Graetz, Can the Income Tax Continue to Be the Major Revenue
Source?, in OPTIONS FoR TAX REFORM 42, 42 (Joseph Pechman ed. , 1 9 84).
1 30. The political history of the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1 98 6 is well covered in
JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. M U RRAY, SHOW DOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBY ISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (I 988); TIMOTHY CONLAN ET. AL.
TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM ( 1 990).
1 3 1 . Some commentators on the campaign contended that the decision to showcase tax reform
was simply to preempt the Democrats from using the issue. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note
1 30, at 3 3-39. In fact, Mondale had no taste for a tax reform platform. Reagan found tax reform
appealing because it offered another opportunity to lower tax rates.
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Growth 1 32-advocated closing numerous tax favors on the personal and cor
porate side and then returning the resulting increases in federal revenues to
taxpayers through major reductions in personal and corporate tax rates.
While not all tax expenditures were closed, 1 3 3 significant savings were antici
pated. Tax rates were reduced accordingly. Top bracket tax rates-Rea
gan's central concern-fell in the President's proposal from fifty percent to
thirty-five percent on the personal side and from forty-eight to thirty-three
percent on the corporate side. 134
In contrast to Carter's proposals, Reagan's were welcome on the Hill.
House Ways and Means Chair Daniel Rostenkowski was a strong supporter,
finding the President's emphasis on loophole closing and significant tax rate
reductions congenial to old-style Democratic Party values of tax fairness for
working people. 135 Rostenkowski strengthened the coalition of support for
tax reform within Ways and Means, but feared that a reform bill would un
ravel to special interest amendments if "open rule" prevailed on the House
floor-that is, the major reform budget B (pN) might become modest reform
budget B(pc, u1c). 136 A first vote on a "closed rule" to limit debate and
amendments failed by twenty-one votes. Importantly, only fourteen Repub
licans voted for the closed rule and (in effect) tax reform. House Speaker Tip
O'Neill called the White House and told President Reagan's staff that reform
could only go forward if the President could personally guarantee that he
had "fifty to seventy-five votes for passage . . . . [T]hen we will begin moving
ahead with the bipartisan reform process. " 1 37 To achieve the required re
form coalition, the President spoke to all House Republicans on the need for
tax reform at a special meeting at the Capitol. Importantly, and for first
time, he promised to veto any reform bill that did not meet his requirements
for personal exemptions and a reduced top tax rate. He assured the Republi
cans that he would not leave them with a selective reform bill that helped
only Democrat constituencies; it would be major reform or no bill at all.
1 32. !d.
1 33 . Those which were not were strategically chosen by then-Secretary of the Treasury James
Baker and his Under Secretary Richard Darman. To appease business Republicans, Baker kept
accelerated depreciation allowances and lowered the top tax rate for capital gains. To satisfy labor
and win over Robert Packwood, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, most fringe benefits re
mained exempt from taxation. To win over the oil and gas coalitions on the Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee, the special tax treatment for oil and gas drilling re
mained. Baker and Darman were coalition building in Congress.
1 34. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 1 30, at 59-60.
1 3 5. !d. at 96- 1 25.
1 36. We should be more precise here. I n building their reform coalition, Baker and Rostenkow
ski in fact gave back tax favors to a few crucial members, denoted by membership in the reform
coalition subgroup C', where now C divides as [C', C'l Thus the major reform budget included
some tax favors for coalition members-that is, B(uc;pc;p1J. The fear, then, was this "pretty
good" reform budget might simply unravel to a very modest reform budget of B(u c;p c; u 1J .
1 37. See BIRNBA UM & MURRAY, supra note 1 30, at 1 66-67.
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This promise proved compelling enough to attract an additional thirty-four
Republican supporters. Staff members then used presidential resources to
attract the additional votes needed to meet O'Neill's target. 1 3 8 With the
closed rule in hand, tax reform passed the House under a simple voice vote!
With the bill now in the hands of the Republican Senate, reform seemed
more assured. It was not easy, however, as the special interest tax groups
began to pressure the Senate. 1 39 Again, presidential intervention was re
quired, this time in the form of a Reagan promise to support Republican
Senator Robert Packwood in his difficult Oregon primary against a hard-core
conservative. 1 40 Packwood was the Chairman of the Senate Finance Com
mittee and the key to any significant reform. With Reagan's promised sup
port for his difficult reelection campaign, Packwood felt responsible for
bringing a reform bill to the Senate which the President could support. He
succeeded with a radical proposal that met the President's veto constraint
and then some. Top rates in the Senate bill were thirty-three percent for the
corporate tax, and twenty-seven percent for the personal tax . 1 4 1 Using a core
coalition of Republicans and tax reform Democrats, Packwood was able to
defeat all amendments to the reform package. In the end, the Senate ap
proved tax reform nearly unanimously; the final vote was ninety-seven to
three. 142 The President signed the final version of the Tax Reform Act of
1 9 86 on October 22, 1 9 86. It was, according to the Wall Street Journal re
porters who covered the process, "[t]he most sweeping overhaul of the tax
code in the nation's history," and "(t)he most important player . . . was Ron
ald Reagan himself." 1 43
What Reagan brought to the reform process were the three ingredients
which Carter lacked: resources to trade, credibility to make trades work,
and the strategic use of the presidential veto. First, Reagan began the reform
process only five months after an overwhelming victory in the 1 9 84 presiden
tial elections, carrying all but one state easily. His approval ratings over the
course of reform deliberations reached personal highs, never falling below
sixty percent. 1 44 Reagan's promise to "share" his popularity in the upcom
ing 1 986 congressional elections was crucial to Senator Packwood's support
and also played a role in finding the needed Republican votes for the pivotal,
1 3 8. !d. at 1 70-72.
1 39. !d. at 1 76.
1 40. !d. at 1 90-9 1 .
1 4 1 . This top rate was a fiction for taxpayers i n the middle income brackets who faced a 5 % tax
surcharge. The true top rate was 32%, still below the President's veto target of 3 5 % . !d. at 220.
142. The conference committee still needed to reconcile differences between the House and Sen
ate bills. The final reform bill followed the Senate version almost exactly. !d. at apps. A, B.
1 43 . !d. at 284, 2 86.

i•
I
j
j
i

�J

j
�
1I
i
j

.j

l

1
I

1 44. The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion, 1 985 ( 1 986) at 233; Public Opinion, 1 986 ( 1 98 7) at 255.
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"closed rule" vote in the House. 1 45 Executive office resources were allocated
to win Congressional support as well-for example, a promise to sign farm
legislation for rural districts, the granting of favorable administrative rulings
on tax filing dates and import quotas for machine tools, and a promise of
visits by cabinet members to congressional districts at election time. 1 46
Second, unlike Carter, Reagan had a reputation as a credible deal maker.
Republican members of Congress in particular trusted the President, and this
meant that reform coalitions could be fashioned. No coalition was more im
portant to reform than the fifty Republican's who joined Reagan and the
Democratic leadership to ensure a closed rule vote on the House version of
the bill. Crucial to this coalition was the credibility of Reagan's promises to
protect their interests in the reform process. 147 While there was virtually no
value of k that Carter could offer to ensure a congressional agreement, Rea
gan's promises seemed to stand with little or no extra guarantees. The result
ing block of fifty Republican votes proved in the end to be Reagan's reform
coalition, c·. Those fifty votes were enough, when joined with the Demo
crats, to ensure passage of reform. But if at any time reform went badly for
the President (specifically, if rates remained too high), those fifty votes could
be joined with other conservative Republicans and special interest losers to
sustain a veto. 1 4 8
Finally, Reagan and his staff knew the importance of the "ali-or-nothing "
offer when seeking major fiscal reform. To give Congress the free hand to
fashion reform, as Carter had done, would mean no reform at al1. 1 49 To
force the aU-or-nothing choice on Congress, Reagan had to fulfill the three
requirements of our model of presidential influence: (1) a reform coalition
capable of sustaining a veto; (2) the credible threat to veto partial reforms in
favor of no reform at all; and (3) a clear, not "fuzzy," veto criterion. Reagan
achieved the first two conditions with his promise to conservative Republi1 45 . BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 1 30, at 1 70, 1 90.
1 46. !d. at 1 72.
1 47. During Reagan's visit to the Hill to find this coalition, Representative Henry Hyde, a leaq
ing conservative, rose to announce: "Mr. President if you say you'll fight for the $2000 exemption,
the rate reduction, effective dates, and lower capital gains rates, I don't need a letter. I'll vote for
it." !d. at 1 7 1 . After Hyde's comments, the meeting changed from an expression of concern over
the path of tax reform to a show of support for the President's policies. !d.
1 48 . When the closed rule vote was first taken, the closed rule (and effectively reform) was de
feated, 223 to 202. O'Neill told Reagan that 50 to 75 (the c· coalition) of those 223 antireform
votes had to be brought over to the side of reform. This would reduce the number of potential
antireform votes to the edge of the veto range. If Reagan were to "release" his c· coalition to
support a veto, there was little question that it would be sustained.
149. This was no more evident during the 1 98 6 deliberations than when the special interest lob
byists took hold of the Senate Finance Committee in the first months of the Senate's efforts to
fashion reform. Only Packwood's leadership, steeled by the promise of Reagan's support, could
close the gate on a new explosion of tax favors. See BIRNBAUM & M URRAY, supra note 1 30, at 1 76234.
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cans to veto all reform bills unless they met his strict tax rate guidelines.
This promise not only earned Reagan his core c· coalition but it also tied his
legislative future to accepting only major tax reforms. To have promised his
most important congressional supporters a veto of partial reform and then to
have backed down would have seriously damaged the Reagan agenda for the
remainder of his term . 1 so
The third requirement for a successful ali-or-nothing strategy is a clear
veto signal. The President chose to draw the line on tax rates: only those
reform proposals with a top rate less than thirty-five percent would avoid a
veto. It is at this point that presidential tax reform received some important
outside help: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit control act,
passed in December 1 985. 1 5 1 GRH made the principle of revenue neutral
ity-tax rate reductions matched by equally valued reductions in tax expend
itures-a real constraint for tax reformers. When the President's
commitment to veto any bill with a top rate greater than thirty-five percent
was joined with GRH, tax expenditures had to be reduced. Unlike Carter
who used a "fuzzy" veto threat aimed at explicit tax favors, Reagan could
force a reduction in most tax expenditures with a simple and clear message
on tax rates alone. That Congress felt the bite of both the veto and the GRH
constraints is clear from their efforts to balance each rate reduction with an
equal savings from tax expenditures. 1 52
Reagan's use of the presidential reform strategy outlined in Part II appears
to have been critical to his success, just as Carter's failure to follow this ap
proach significantly undercut his efforts. Unlike Carter, Reagan and his staff
were quite willing to trade on the discretionary resources available to the
administration to garner votes. They also were willing to threaten a veto if
the clear outline of the proposed tax amendments were violated. This was
high risk politics, but the economic and political payoffs were high too. The
Tax Reform Act of 1 986 greatly reduced tax loopholes and, we also empha
size, improved the overall progressivity of our federal tax system. 1 53
CONCLUSION

Both the academy and the public have criticized the growing inefficien
cies-"waste"-in government programs. The new political economy has
identified one important explanation for this phenomenon in congressional
budgeting-the decentralization of Congress and the norm of universalism.
In its classic form, universalism reflects an individually rational response to
1 50. In contrast, Carter's retreat from the $50 rebate in 1 977 may have cost him dearly in his
efforts to achieve major tax reform in 1 97 8 . See Kantowicz, supra note 1 07, at 223.
1 5 1 . Pub. L. No. 99- 1 77, 99 Stat. 1 037 ( 1 9 8 5).
! 52. CONLAN ET. AL., supra note 1 30, at 5 1 .
1 5 3 . See Gravelle, supra note 1 04, at 30.
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the collective action problems inherent within a decentralized legislative
body. At the same time, in the aggregate, such behavior can lead individual
legislators to ignore the larger social costs of their actions and lead them to
pass wasteful domestic budgets.
Congress has recently experimented with a variety of mechanisms to over
come these difficulties. The military base closing commission and GRH are
prominent examples. We believe that the powers of the Presidency, espe
cially informal resources for coalition building and the strategic use of formal
veto powers, offer additional tools to force useful economic reforms.
Robert Reischauer, current head of the Congressional Budget Office, has
observed, "Although it is congressional, the [budget] process is incapable of
producing major shifts in priorities or dealing with the difficult issues of re
trenchment and deficit reduction without the cooperation and leadership of
the President." 1 54 Our analysis lends support to this conclusion. As outlined
here, the President can overcome an inefficient Congress unanimously op
posed to change by forming an effective veto coalition and presenting an "aU
or-nothing" budget offer that forces individual members of Congress to face
the full social costs of their legislative actions. The result can be significant
budget reform. President Reagan's success using our veto c u m budget strat
egy and President Carter's contrasting failure without our strategy are, we
feel, telling lessons for other public executives-be they mayors, governors,
or future Presidents-seeking better fiscal policies from their own decentral
ized legislative bodies.

1 54. Robert Reischauer, The Congressional Budget Process, in FEDERAL B U DGET PoLI CY I N
1 9 80s 3 8 5 , 3 86 ( 1 984).
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